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THE BIBLICAL VIEW OF TIME

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IT is by no means fortuitous that our contemporary world is deeply occupied with the problem of time. The literature which has gathered about this problem is not only abundant but also notable for the ways in which various disciplines have sought to wrestle with it. The natural scientist, the philosopher, the theologian, the historian, the sociologist, the poet, and the writer of fiction and drama have all engaged in a common encounter with the mystery of this basic givenness of our human existence. Yet, while it is true that periods like our own incite reflection on time's meaning, the problem plays a rôle in the history of human thought quite beyond that of the pressures and hazards of eras of social crisis. It is not too much to say that the whole history of human thought and reflection has been involved in one way or another with this central reality of our human existence. Civilization and culture, philosophy and religion, *Weltanschauung*, and *ethos* divide at the point of their primary pre-occupation with space and time. In every philosophy of history it is the concept of time that is decisive and determinative.[1] In the ancient world "the time experience is both rich and subtle. . . . Time is experienced in the periodicity and rhythm of man's own life as well as in the life of nature. Each phase of man's life — childhood, adolescence, maturity, old age — is a time of peculiar qualities."[2] From the age of Plato and Aristotle to our own philosophers have sought to grapple with this problem. Indeed, modern thought is turning to it with an intensity of concern that makes it the dominant if not the undergirding issue in our thought and reflection.[3]

[1] Cf. Paul Minear, Eyes of Faith (Philadelphia, 1946), p. 97: "The pivotal category in every philosophy of history is the *concept* of time; the pivotal reality in every perspective of life, whether or not it has been articulated in a conscious and systematic philosophy of history, is the *sense* of time."

[2] H. and H. A. Frankfurt (editors), The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man (Chicago, 1946), p. 23. The words are from Frankfurt's opening chapter.

[3] Erich Frank, Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth, p. 65: John

Time's hidden mystery lies deep within us all. To live is to live in time, and our consciousness and thinking are so commingled with its movement, so intimately involved in its flux and the inexorability of temporal changes that the quest for serenity and interior tranquility never ceases to occupy us. At an early age we feel ourselves its victims. We are haunted again and again by the painful awareness that the shining moment passes, the day comes to an end, some silver cord of confidence is snapped, some dream dispelled, some faith shattered. The whirligig of Time brings in its revenges. The present forever flees to the past, the future forever breaks in with relentless speed. We are forever confronted with the unexpected, the unanticipated, the new. In an instant, in the twinkling of an eye, before the completion of this sentence — if ever, indeed, this sentence is finished, something may happen which will alter its intended meaning or our very situation; indeed, the situation at each point in the speaking of our words is a different one. Nature, too, joins in the moving pageantry of time. The seasons come and go, and each leaves its mark deeply etched in our feelings and thoughts and dim presentiments. The fresh verdure of spring deepens into the full-blown luxuriance of radiant summer, and then comes October when the leaves grow ashen and sober, the leaves grow crisped and sere. The goddess of fertility dies, and the world mourns. Or the goddess becomes the victim of space and retires into the jaws of the subterranean darkness (Persephone, and the others), and it is *cold*. We need not learn this experience from the great nature myths; we all of us feel it very deeply at some time or other. There is something profoundly disquieting and threatening in the temporality of existence: [4]

Marsh, The Fulness of Time (London, 1952). Cf. his words on p. 1: "Time is perhaps the focal as it is certainly a pressing problem of our age. It may seem simple and harmless enough to study its nature, but the results can be revolutionary. Einstein has brought about a revolution in our understanding of the universe, and Marx has provoked a series of revolutions in history. To study time is more than to seek a definition for a word; for while time is not itself, as we believe, the ultimate reality, it cannot properly be discussed unless questions of ultimate reality are asked, and, as far as may be, answered."

[4] William Wordsworth, "Ode on Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood."

There was a time when meadow, grove, and stream,
the earth and every common sight,
To me did seem
Apparelled in celestial light,
The glory and the freshness of a dream.
It is not now as it hath been of yore; —
Turn whereso 'er I may,
By night or day,
The things which I have seen I now can see no more.

The transitoriness of life afflicts us. The grass withers, the flower fades. Surely the people is grass.[5]

our years come to an end like a sigh.
The years of our life are three score years and ten,
or even by reason of strength four score;
yet their span [6] is but toil and trouble;
they are soon gone, and we fly away.
(Ps. 90:9b–10b.)

It is not surprising that it is the poets who have entered most deeply into the perplexities which time raises for us. There is a profound reason for this which is involved in their sensitiveness to words and language and the relation of speech to the ear, and of the hearing of the ear to time. But into this matter we cannot go at present. The only writer I have read who understands this problem is St. Augustine, and to him we shall refer at a later point. But the colossal reality of time is expressed in Edith Sitwell's "The Shadow of Cain" where she senses magnificently the primeval cold in which Time is frozen after Cain's terrible fratricide; in W. H. Auden's Tillichian reflections on *kairos* and

[5] Compare Psalm 39:4–6:
Lord, let me know my end,
and what is the measure of my days;
let me know how fleeting my life is!
Behold! thou hast made my days a few handbreadths,
and my lifetime is as nothing in thy sight.
Surely every man stands as a mere breath!

Surely man goes about as a shadow!
Surely for nought are they in turmoil:
man heaps up, and knows not who he will gather.
See also Psalm 144:4; Job 7:6; 13:25; 14:1–2.
[6] So RSV. Cf. Greek, Syriac, and Targum.

logos or on the heavy burden of clock time in the opening lines of "For the Time Being"; or in T. S. Eliot's Four Quartets where he senses the bafflement of our temporality and then flees too precipitately, as it seems to me, to a timeless world of the eternal present. And surprisingly, perhaps, it is e.e.cummings who seizes upon the mystery with perception and sensitiveness and withal, with courage:

> and now you are and I never now and we're
> a mystery which will never happen again
> a miracle which has never happened before —
> and shining this our now must turn to then
> our then shall be some darkness during which
> fingers are without hands; and I have no
> you; and all trees (any more than each
> leafless) its silent in forevering snow
> — but never fear (my own, my beautiful,
> my blossoming) for also then's until.

We cannot hold the treasured moment even for an instant. We cannot say to it, "Verweile doch, du bist so schön." [7]

The true poets sense intuitively the mystery of words spoken in time; perhaps this is a clue to an understanding of much of what seems to us obscure and tangled and tortured in contemporary verse. But they are by the same token deeply conscious of the malaise which afflicts the soul of man and the distraughtness that disturbs contemporary civilization. They know man's inveterate propensity to spatialize the outer and inner worlds of reality. We in our modern technological society tend to measure all things

[7] The familiar line appears twice in Faust, first before Faust makes his pact with Mephistopheles:

> Werd'ich zum Augenblicke sagen:
> Verweile doch! du bist so schön!
> Dann magst du mich in Fesseln schlagen,
> Dann will ich gern zu Grunde gehn!

In the second part where Faust finally meets his destiny he says:

> Zum Augenblicke dürft' ich sagen:
> Verweile doch, du bist so schön!
> Es kann die Spur von meinen Erdentagen
> Nicht in Aeonen untergehen —
> Im Vorgefühl von solchen hohen Glück
> Geniess ich jetzt den höchsten Augenblick.

in heaven and earth. We interpret values by things; we understand by statistics; we are awed by size and numbers; we plot the configurations of the soul; we lapse into stereotyped uniformities; we diagnose the ills of man and nation by graphs. Yet it is with time itself that we wage battle: time that grows incoherent, time that will not stay for scrutiny or an answer, time that is burdened with the past and slouches reelingly into an unknown future. The manifestations of our interior conflicts between space and time are witnessed in our art, in our music, in our contemporary drama.

Of the two great peoples who have exerted a major influence upon the mind and soul of Western man, Hellas and Israel, the one lived and thought primarily in the world of space, the other primarily in the world of time. The Greeks, as Matthew Arnold never wearied of saying, sought to see life steadily and to see it whole. To them the world was animate, and to it they ascribed a world soul or *nous*. In Nature they perceived a form and structure or rather a structural necessity whose perfect representation they saw in the circle. Time was thus comprehended in the cyclical round of recurring seasons, and their myths bodied them forth in dramatic celebrations. Time is subordinated to nature. This is clearly stated by Aristotle: ". . . and so time is regarded as the rotation of the sphere (cf. IV. 10, 218b: 'the revolution of the all-embracing heaven') . . . And this is the reason of our habitual way of speaking; for we say that human affairs and those of all other things . . . seem to be in a way circular, because all these things come to pass in time and have their beginning and end as it were 'periodically.' " [8] In the words of Hans Kohn: "Their art (i.e., the Greek) was plastic, space-

[8] Physics, IV, 14, 223b21 cited by Erich Frank, Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth, note 41, p. 82. See the detailed discussion. For a corrective to this somewhat partial and one-sided view, see Thorlieff Boman, Das hebraeischen Denken im Vergleich mit dem griechischen, Second Edition (Goettingen, 1954), pp. 111 ff.; English translation, Hebrew Thought Compared with the Greek (Philadelphia, 1960), pp. 125 ff., and Rudolf Bultmann's review of Boman's work in Gnomon (Band 27, 1955), pp. 55 ff. For the Platonic view of time as the moving image of a static and unmovable eternity, see the remarkable passage in the Timaeus (J. H. Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, Third edition, 1931, Vol. III, p. 456): "Wherefore he resolved to have a moving image of eternity, and when he set in order the heaven, he made this image eternal but moving according to number, while eternity itself rests in unity; and this image we call time. For

dominating and space-forming, as if they sought to transpose the flowing, fleeting, ever-related elements of life into rest, space, limitation, and to give the formless form. . . . The Greek turned everything into form and marble in a supreme effort to eliminate the restlessness of time from the world. He endowed the world with the instruments of scientific thought, and tamed the Dionysian overflow of events into the supreme majesty of Apollonic order." [9] John Keats has given immortal expression to this capturing of the moment of time in his "Ode to a Grecian Urn." The recently discovered Winged Victory or The Winged Victory which stands so impressively at the head of the stairs in the Louvre are said to have been taken from the prow of a Greek ship ploughing its way through the winds and blue waters of the Aegean. Here we have a superb representation of movement, of life, of surging progress in stone. We see it, too, in the battle of the centaurs from the Parthenon, the frieze from the mausoleum of Halicarnasus, and in the Alexander sarcophagus at Istanbul.

To this predominantly spatial mentality of ancient Greece the mentality of Israel posed a perfect contrast. This does not mean that Israel ignores or rejects the world of space nor does it mean that ancient Greece did not take time seriously. *Au contraire*! As Professor Heschel has put it: "To disparage space and the blessing of things of space, is to disparage the works of creation, the works which God saw and 'it was good.' The world cannot be seen exclusively *sub specie temporis*. Time and space are inter-related." [10] But space is not in control. The much misunderstood first chapter of Genesis begins with the creation of the first day.[11] God gives day and night status: "God called the

there were no days and nights and months and years before heaven was created, and when he constructed the heaven, he created them also. They are all parts of time, and the past and future are created species of time, which we unconsciously but wrongly transfer to the eternal essence; for we say he 'was,' he 'is,' he 'will be,' but the truth is that 'is' alone is properly attributed to him, and that 'was' and 'will be' are only to be spoken of becoming in time, for they are motions, but that which is unmoveably the same cannot become older or younger by time. . . ."

[9] The Idea of Nationalism (New York, 1945), p. 31.

[10] A. J. Heschel, The Sabbath (New York, 1951), p. 6; see also "Space, Time, and Reality," Judaism (Vol. I, No. 3, July, 1952), pp. 262–273.

[11] See especially Augustine's discussion in his Confessions, Book XI.

light Day, and the darkness he called Night. And there was evening and there was morning, one day." Time is not dependent upon the creation of the heavenly bodies of sun and moon; they are not only created on the fourth day, but they themselves exist under the sovereignty of a God who assigns to them their special work and function. They are created for history. A comparison of the biblical references to sun, moon, and stars with those of the other Near Eastern texts discloses the radical difference between Israel and the surrounding peoples: in Israel the mystery and meaning of time is not resolved by appeal to the cosmic world of space; among the other nations the heavenly bodies are deified and *chronos* spatializes time into extension and duration.[12] In the one, time is grasped in terms of purpose, will, and decision; in the other the secrets of the stars are determined by "those who divide the heavens, who gaze at the stars, who at the new moons predict what shall befall you" (Isa. 47:13. Cf. also and especially 44:24 ff.).

From the beginning the religion of Israel was imageless. Nothing in heaven and earth was adequate to its representation of the holy God of the Exodus and of Sinai. The God of Israel is active, active in time and event; he cannot be transformed into space. In the ark cloistered in the Holy of Holies of the temple at Jerusalem Yahweh was doubtless believed to be truly present, but the staves beneath the ark were a perpetual witness to his mobility (cf. II Sam. 7:4–7), and finally it disappears from history without even a mention of its loss. The sanctuaries are constantly under trenchant criticism of the prophets, and Jeremiah's life is imperilled by his word that the temple must be destroyed. One of the accusations against Jesus was that he said he would destroy the temple. The sanctuaries are holy places, to be sure, but what makes them holy is that they are characteristically associated with aetiological stories which commemorate "historical" events, moments in which Yahweh had appeared to the patriarchs, or to Joshua, David, and others. Not the physical structure of space (as the nature cults would have it), but the historical event

[12] It is significant that we owe our measurement of clock time to Mesopotamia with its sexigesimal system of reckoning: a 360° circle with degrees each of 60 minutes, and minutes each of 60 seconds. Cyrus H. Gordon, Introduction to Old Testament Times (Ventnor, N.J., 1953), p. 1.

in time is remembered and treasured and passed on from generation to generation.

The forty-first chapter of Isaiah is a good illustration of the conflict between the space mentality of the nations and the time mentality of Israel. Yahweh calls the nations of the world to judgment in a solemn conclave. He raises at once the historical question involved in the conquests of Cyrus:

> Who stirred up one from the east
> whom victory meets at every step?
> He gives up nations before him,
> so that he tramples kings under foot;
> he makes them like dust with his sword,
> like driven stubble his bow.
> He pursues them and passes safely,
> by paths his feet have not trod.
> (Isaiah 41:2–3.)

The nations of the world are terrified by this challenge in the realm of time and history. They flee to the world of space and resort to man's consummate attempt to make of the sovereign God of nature and of history an idol and a thing. In their fear they say to each other "Take courage!"; in their helplessness they help each other in fashioning an idol; in their weakness they make the idol strong. With Israel the situation is completely otherwise: she is addressed by her God who says "Fear not," she is given assurance of divine help, and she is promised strength, and always in the concrete context of time:

> But you, Israel, my servant,
> Jacob, whom I have chosen,
> the offspring of Jacob, my friend;
> You whom I took from the ends of the earth,
> and called from its farthest corners,
> saying to you, "You are my servant,"
> I have chosen you and not cast you off;
> I will strengthen you, I will help you,
> I will uphold you with my victorious right hand.
> (Isaiah 41:8–10.)

When the trial is renewed, the issue is drawn much more sharply. The nations are urged to tell of former and latter events, of what has happened and what is still to happen, "that we may know that you are gods." But they are *silent*; they have only the things which their hands have made. The problem and mystery of time cannot be spatially resolved. Time is confronted and encountered only by a transcendent Lord of time who yet reveals himself in the events of time.

But this is not meant to imply that Israel thinks speculatively concerning the meaning of time. Such speculation is absent from the Old Testament as it is absent in many other areas of theological concern. Rather it is in the actual course of her holy history that she sees the revelation of One who initiates, guides, and directs events, and interprets their meaning through his servants the prophets. In this sense Israel is the historical people, or as Professor Tillich states it, *das geschichtliche Volk schlechthin*. Israel lives her life in a world of eventful reality to which no image or creature of space could ever do adequate justice.

Yet there were experiences in her history which provided her with the symbolism by which to express what it was that God was doing in the directing and guiding of her existence. One of the most striking of these symbols was the *way* or *road* (דרך). This symbol was an expression of the onward movement of time within her life, its historical character, its ever changing vicissitudes.[13] Each stage of her journey presented her with new situations to which she was called to answer in a responsible way. The path she walked became the primary image for her ethical life. Piety was a walking with God. The road led to a destination, and thus became an eschatological symbol, notably in Second Isaiah. Thus history, ethics, personal piety, providence, and eschatology were all represented by the simple figure. Heracleitus said that we never step into the same river twice. For Israel it was the way, and the motif weaves itself throughout the Old and New Testaments. Jesus makes use of it in his teaching, and the

[13] The road is understood only in relation to those who walk upon it, to those who know their starting-point and their destination, who pursue a course in life, and are called to decision at the crossroads. There are many different kinds of walking and of going; the Hebrew is careful to differentiate each.

covenanters at Qumran and the early Christians were described by it.

The road was a peculiarly congenial symbol since it had figured so largely in the epochal moments of Israel's life: from Egypt to the mount of covenanting, from Sinai to the promised land, from Palestine into exile, and from Babylon to the hill of Zion. It was congenial in other respects also, for it pointed to beginning and end, to initial moments in which God revealed himself in his unmotivated grace and to consummating moments in which he fulfilled his purpose and promise. Again, this road was not a circular turning. Cyclical views were current in the nature religions of the Near East, but Israel's conception is linear, not a straight line of unilinear development, but one which moved tortuously as history itself. There was no immanent structure in history whereby the movement could be discerned by logical patterns, no form by which men might plot the course of events, no *ἀνάγκη* to which even God must submit, no law of development or progress which the wise or the *bien-instruits* could recognize. Yahweh was the Leader: he leads Abraham who walks by obedience and faith; he leads Israel by the moving pillar of cloud and pillar of fire; he leads the batallions that return to Zion. Israel does not know the way of her history; only God knows it. As the people of God, Israel moves through history under his lordship and sovereignty, his righteous leading and grace. The Deuteronomists, to be sure, see in history the working out of a logically coherent moral sovereignty, but it is God's rule, not Israel's possession of a law of inner historical development, that is central; moreover, Deuteronomic theodicy was transcended by the course of history itself and by the prophets and sages who saw more deeply into the perplexities of life in history.

An examination of one or two of the words employed in Israel's extensive vocabulary of time affords us some further insight into the way in which it was apprehended in ancient Israel. The most common word for time, עת, occurs 297 times, and is derived from the root ענה, "to answer" or "to meet." Thus time is occurrence; it is "that which meets you in your path through life." [14] The

[14] H. Wheeler Robinson, Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testament

Old Testament has no way of distinguishing between chronological and concrete or "realistic" time.[15] The Septuagint renders the word as *kairos* in over two-thirds of all the instances of its appearance. Often the expression is used in a formal or general sense such as "in that time" or "it came to pass in that time" (ויהי בעת ההוא cf., e.g., Gen. 21:22; 38:1; Deut. 1:16, 18). The clause "it came to pass" (Heb. ויהי; Gk. καὶ ἐγένετο) is one of the most frequent in the Bible, which is generally omitted in the R.S.V., and represents a distinct loss since the eventfulness of biblical mentality is thereby obscured. The word עת is associated very frequently with the events and phenomena of nature or man's life in nature in the activity of farming. Thus times are described as those of rain (the former and the latter), of threshing, of pruning, of harvest, of the singing of birds, of the drying up of the wadies, of the birth of mountain goats and does.[16] Or it is characterized by the events of human life: birth, adolescence, menstruation, old age, and death. Historical periods are dated by the time of the fathers, or the days when the judges judged, or the time of David the King. Qoheleth introduces his catalog of times with the generalization, "To everything there is a season, (לכל זמן) and a time for every matter (ועת לכל-חפץ) under heaven." His attitude toward time is hardly typical of the rest of the Old Testament, but his vivid witness to the concreteness of time is nowhere surpassed in the whole Bible:

(Oxford, 1946), pp. 109 ff. Note especially Appendix A on "The Vocabulary of Time." The basic work on the terminology of time in the Old Testament is still von Orelli's Die hebraeischen Synonyma der Zeit und Ewigkeit genetisch und sprachvergleichend dargestellt (Leipzig, 1871). While some of his linguistic observations have been superseded, his understanding of the different movements of time is perceptive and illuminating (see esp. pp. 13–40).

[15] John Marsh, The Fullness of Time, p. 20. But this must not be taken to mean that Israel does not know chronological time. Cf. Millar Burrows, "Thy Kingdom Come," JBL (LXXIV [1955], pp. 2 ff.).

[16] Compare the Gezer calendar from the latter part of the tenth century B.C.:

His two months are (olive) harvest,
His two months are planting (grain),
His two months are late planting;
His month is hoeing up flax,
His month is harvest of barley,
His month is harvest and *feasting*;
His months are vine-tending,
His month is summer fruit.

a time to be born, and a time to die;
a time to plant, and a time to pluck up what is planted;
a time to kill, and a time to heal;
a time to break down, and a time to build up;
a time to weep, and a time to laugh;
. . . . .
a time to seek, and a time to lose;
a time to keep, and a time to cast away;
a time to keep silence, and a time to speak;
a time to love, and a time to hate;
a time for war, and a time for peace.
(Ecclesiastes 3:2–4a, 6–8.)

To which Qoheleth adds the somewhat lugubrious reflection: "What gain has the worker from his toil?" [17] It is clear from these many passages that biblical time is *concrete time*; properly we should speak of *times* rather than time; any abstract meaning is generally remote from the writer's thought. Between man and time there is an interior, psychic relationship. The Israelite is not *primarily* concerned with duration or extent of time. He is not primarily interested in measuring its distances or in determining the extent of its duration. "For the Israelite time is not merely a form or frame. Time is charged with substance, or, rather, it is identical with substance; time is the development of the very events." [18] The character of time depends upon that which happens in it, and to these concrete happenings he stood in a living relation. Let us put it in another way: time is believed somehow to be alive. Yahweh says to Abraham in promising him the long-expected child that he will return "when the season lives or revives" (כעת חיה), and Job implores Yahweh that the night in which he was born may not rejoice among the days of the year but be barren and cursed (Job 3:6–7). In a word,

[17] Compare the ancient Stoic who sought to eliminate temporality from life; his *Entweltlichung* is *Entzeitlichung*. Since he sees his own being in a timeless logos and concentrated completely upon the logos-being, he extricates himself from all conditions (*Bedingungen*) and thus negates the future for himself. His present is no true present, because it knows no decision before the future. See Rudolph Bultmann, Das Urchristentum, p. 161; English translation, Primitive Christianity, p. 144. See also pp. 149 ff.

[18] Johannes Pedersen, Israel: Its Life and Culture, I–II, p. 488.

"there are as many times as there are souls. Everything has its time." [19] Jeremiah chides Israel that

> Even the stork in the heavens
> knows her times;
> and the turtledove, swallow, and crane
> keep the time of their coming;
> but my people know not
> the ordinance of the LORD. (Jer. 8:7.)

This concreteness of Israel's thinking is emphasized by the other words in the terminology of time: day, month, and year. Every day has its distinctive character. A man's life consists of his days. The day has morning, noon, and night, but each of these terms has its own specific content; what is significant is what happens, or what man does, in those periods. There are days which are so filled with content that they mean more than months of duration-time, and these days are preserved and remembered within the *nephesh* or life-soul of the person or community which experiences them. Of these special days in Israel's life the seventh is to be remembered above all others: "Remember the sabbath day to keep it holy, for in six days God made heaven and earth." It is the Sabbath which forms the culmination of the priestly story of the creation; in a sense all else is but a prologue to it. Professor Heschel has written a beautiful and profound discussion of this day in his book on The Sabbath, and I can do no better than repeat some of his words. After pointing out the meaning of "one of the most distinguished words in the Bible," the word "holy" or קדוש he comments: [20]

> It is, indeed, a unique occasion at which the distinguished word *qadosh* is used for the first time: in the Book of Genesis at the end of the story of creation. How extremely significant is the fact that it is applied to time: "And God blessed the seventh day and made it *holy*." There is no reference in the record to any object of space that would be endowed with the quality of holiness.
>
> This is a radical departure from accustomed religious thinking.

[19] Pedersen, ibid., p. 488.

[20] A. J. Heschel, The Sabbath, p. 9. In the Accadian creation myth, The Enuma elish, the epic culminates in the erection of the temple to Marduk at Babylon.

> The mythical mind would expect that, after heaven and earth have been established, God would create a holy place — a holy mountain or a holy spring — whereupon a sanctuary is to be established. Yet it seems as if to the Bible it is a *holiness in time*, the Sabbath, which comes first.

Man lives from the day of his birth to the day of his death, yet in each day he is aware that this is the day that Yahweh has made (Ps. 118:24.). He knows, too, that there is a decisive, final day. Israel remembers such decisive days, such as the day of Jerusalem or of Jezreel or of Midian, and the contexts in which these expressions occur show how crucial they are. Yahweh of hosts has a day, and his day stands sovereign over the days of man (Isa. 2:6 ff.). It is the day when Israel and, indeed, all the nations of the world are to be held accountable for the days which have been allotted to them. The repeated assertion that the Day is near is an expression in the category of time of the utter urgency of Yahweh's demand upon Israel's life. "Our times are in thy hand," cries the psalmist in a setting which admirably expresses the relation between man's time and God's time (Ps. 31:15).

Biblical time is comprehended not by its extent but by its immediacy, not by its quantitative measurements, but by its quality, by the nature of the content with which it is filled. These characteristics are illustrated by the relationship of time to generations. Time is a succession of on-going generations. Each generation has its specific content. It has the stamp of the progenitor upon it.[21] Thus Abraham lives on in the generations which follow him; to be the children of Abraham is to live as Abraham lived, to do the works of the father. Father and son bear a profound psycho-physical relation, the son has his father within him. In the tenth chapter of Genesis the peoples of Near Eastern antiquity are comprehended in the structure of a genealogy. On Mount Sinai Yahweh declares his name to Moses: "Say to the people of Israel, 'Yahweh, the God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, has sent me to you.': this is my name for ever, and thus I am

[21] Pedersen, ibid., pp. 276–279, 475–479. Note p. 476: "When the Israelites speak of their ancestor, then it is not as a remote figure which has disappeared long ago. He constantly shares in what happens, the history of the people is his."

to be remembered throughout all generations" (Exod. 3:15[E]). Yahweh is Israel's God in all generations (Ps. 90:1), his faithfulness endures to all generations (Ps. 100:5), his kingdom is from generation to generation (Dan. 4:3). The Gospel of Matthew opens with the generations from Abraham to David, from David to Jeconiah, from Jeconiah to the birth of Jesus; and Luke carries his genealogy back to Adam. Thus the whole of the sacred history is understood in terms of the succession of father and son, and in this succession the time-life of Israel is comprehended. It is time lived in the ongoing movement of continuing solidarities.[22] Each generation has the stamp of the father and the son upon it.

We may now turn to another area in which the mystery of time is grasped in ancient Israel. In the dynamic, living experience of speaking and hearing the hiddenness of time is somehow, strangely, articulated and bodied forth. The concreteness of time in event is matched by the concreteness of speech in the word. What the eye was to the ancient Greek, that the ear was to the man of Israel.[23] The realm of maximum reality was that of speaking-hearing.[24] The appeal which rings throughout the Bible

[22] In the first nine chapters of I Chronicles Israel's generation history is illuminatingly comprehended in successive generations from Adam to David. "All Israel was enrolled by genealogies" (I Chron. 9:1). Compare Wheeler Robinson, Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testment (p. 106): "But history, gathering the story of many generations, can show the depth of meaning in the divine will and at the same time its dynamic force. It can show the inner and outer worlds in their ceaseless interaction (cf. Amos iv. 13), creating the very values by which history will eventually pass judgment upon itself. History can show the working out of the divine pattern of which Nature is the warp and man the woof. It is no local accident and no provincial or racial idiosyncrasy that the revelation which holds the greatest place in the world's history should itself have been made through history."

[23] Hans Kohn, ibid., pp. 32 ff.

[24] The relation of hearing to time is now increasingly understood. Cf., Boman, ibid., p. 142: "The sense which is plainly made for successive impressions is hearing. We *see* the spatial and *hear* the temporal." See also pp. 206 f. With this judgment, compare Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, pp. 30 ff.; Edmond Jacob, Theology of the Old Testament (English translation, New York, 1958) and especially the perceptive article by Erwin W. Straus, "Aesthesiology and Hallucination," in Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology (Edited by Rollo May, New York, 1958). His discussion of the spectrum of the senses is important for an understanding of Hebraic mentality. Note his words on p. 158: "The eye is the agent for identification and stabilization, the ear an organ for perceiving the actuality of happenings. There exists in phenomena a temporal co-existence of sound and hearing, whereas the visible is peculiarly time-less with

from beginning to end is to *hear*, to listen, to respond to words, to accept the responsibility of being addressed. Not only are the barriers of our interior isolation broken in the acceptance of this speaking-hearing relation, but all that which is implied in this encounter and engagement and participation of the "I" communicating itself in words and the "Thou" answering to the "I's" communication provides for us the final matrix in which our lives in history are lived. Yet these generalizations concerning the speaking-hearing relation are insufficient for the true understanding of the relation of speech and time. The full import of their relation is first borne in upon us when we expose ourselves existentially to the innumerable concrete moments in which concrete time is encountered with the concrete word spoken, under the immediate urgency of the demand to hear. Nature, worship, personal experience; past, present, and future; creation, revelation, eschatology; life, death, and responsibility are all of them interpreted and appropriated in the reality of words spoken and heard.

> Hear, O heavens, give ear, O earth,
> for the LORD has spoken. (Isa. 1:2.)
>
> Give ear, O heavens, and I will speak;
> and let the earth hear the words of my mouth.
> May my teaching drop as the rain,
> my speech distil as the dew. (Deut. 32:1–2b.)
>
> Hear this word, O Israelites. (Amos 3:1.)
>
> The word of the LORD came to me. (Jer. 1:4.)
>
> I am watching over my word to perform it. (Jer. 1:12.)

Israel, the Servant of the Lord, lives each day under the expectation of Yahweh's speech: "Morning by morning he wakens my ear" (Isa. 50:4). National and social crises are met by resort to the prophetic word (cf., e.g., Micaiah and Jeremiah). And it is the function of the prophet to respond to the specific time by

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respect to the gaze which can rest on it, turn from it, and return to it. Cochlearis and vestibularis . . . are both parts of *one* organ, the actuality organ. . . . The cochlea informs us how our environment is at the moment directed toward us, the vestibularis directs us at the moment toward our environment."

speaking the word of the Lord which communicates not only the meaning of the specific time but also the context of it in the wider ranges of times past and times future, of memory and expectation. Thus prediction becomes a living reality of prophetic speech, and in Second Isaiah constitutes the reality which demonstrates not only the existence of God but also his oneness and the way by which he reveals himself. The writer of the Fourth Gospel describes a great crisis in the life of Jesus. Many of his disciples are offended by his drastic words concerning his body and blood, and many of them draw back and no longer walk with him. Jesus then says, "Will you also go away?" and Peter replies, "Lord, to whom shall we go? You have the words of eternal life, and we have believed and come to know that you are the Holy One of God." Thus throughout the Bible the mystery of time is related to the mystery of life lived in speech.

Words move . . . only in time.

As in so many other aspects of biblical theology, it is Second Isaiah who sees the relation of word and event, of time and speech, in its most inclusive and spacious dimensions. His contemporaries are overborne by the meaninglessness of what is happening at the end of the neo-Babylonian and the approach of the Persian age. The incoherence of time and event plunge them into despair and doubt. To these moods the prophet replies with a triumphant declaration concerning the Word of God. God's Word rules and controls all of Nature, and the whole movement of history from beginning to end is understood by the activity of his Word. From creation to redemption His Word goes forth to accomplish his will and purpose:

> For as the rain and the snow come down from heaven,
> and return not thither but water the earth,
> making it bring forth and sprout,
> giving seed to the sower and bread to the eater,
> so shall my word be that goes forth from my mouth;
> it shall not return to me empty,
> but it shall accomplish that which I purpose,
> and prosper in the thing for which I sent it.
> (Isaiah 55:10–11.)

And it is this Word — with all its tremendous cosmic and temporal perspectives — which achieves ever new and surprising depths in the prophet's eschatological drama. It is a word deep and full of mystery, a hidden word, yet its concreteness is eloquently affirmed in relation to the world-shaking events of a particular time. To this Word the Servant of the Lord listens, and in this Word he hears the meaning of his destiny, the meaning of his mission, the meaning of all his *heilsgeschichtliche* memories and *heilsgeschichtliche* hopes. Yet it is not a cryptic word which only the professionals of the cult treasure in secret. Rather, hidden word though it is, it is one that all may hear, and it is a word as long as time is long and as spacious as nature, yet dominating both by the might of its sovereign will and purpose.

Our examination of the relation of time and word introduces us to another aspect of biblical thought: the meaning of creation and its connection with time. The world is *created*: "By the word of the LORD were the heavens made, and all their host by the breath of his mouth" (Ps. 33:6). The biblical doctrine of creation is a derivative of history, the sacred history of the chosen people. The creation account in Genesis 1 is not only prologue to the history which follows it and thus to be read in relation to it, but is also a development of the election-historical life, of the redemptive history which has the Exodus as its center. It is a product of the mature reflection of Israel upon the meaning of her history within the purpose and grace of God.

But why does the priestly writer employ the Word of God as the instrument of the divine creation? If words are in time and are "timely," how are we to understand God's words in relation to creation? Augustine devotes himself to a profound discussion of this in the eleventh Book of his Confessions (VI.8). "But how dost thou speak? In the way that the voice came out of the cloud saying, 'This is my beloved Son?' For that voice passed and the second after the first, the third after the second, and so forth in order, until the last after the rest, and silence after the last. Whence it is abundantly clear and plain that the motion of a creature expressed it, itself temporal, serving thy eternal will." The relevant passage is too long to quote here, but the upshot of it is that Augustine is unwilling to stress crea-

tion as a temporal event; such an emphasis only raises for him more questions than it answers. "This is my Word," says Augustine, "which is also the Beginning, because it also speaketh to us." "Believe me to be the Beginning because that (*sic*) you may believe, I not only am, but also speak to you." The activity of God's word in creation is the language which only faith can grasp; the appeal is not to reason, for reason would defy it, but to faith, which rejoices in the word addressed to it, and that which is said in words is the reality which only faith can discern. Thus the heavens are constantly telling the glory of God, telling it in the time-speech of the story of their creation. And in that story where words and events coalesce we apprehend the ground of our existence; we confess that we are not our own, but belong in every hour of our lives to One who has revealed himself in time, and even in the creation of the universe and ourselves addresses us in the time language of words and faith.

Nature, then, has no independent status. The conception of *physis* is alien to the Old Testament. To the ancient Israelite neither nature nor history *is*, but both are events, happenings. "The 'thing' is always the 'thing done': space is produced by event." The world of nature like the chosen people lives under covenantal bond. The world continues by God's faithfulness to his covenant, as Israel continues by his faithfulness to the Sinaitic covenant. "Thus says the LORD: If I have not established my covenant with day and night and the ordinances of heaven and earth, then I will reject the descendants of Jacob and David my servant. . . ." "The world was not an ontological necessity" (Heschel).

Biblical faith moves in the world of time: of all kinds of times and situations, times that are never the same but shift and change kaleidoscopically. We may trace passages here and there which suggest some structure in nature or in history (cf., e.g., Jer. 31:35–37; Gen. 8:22 or the Deuteronomic frame-work of Judges), but the view of the Bible as a whole is that both exist under God's constant providence and care, and that both may be brought to an end at any moment. Therefore Israel lives by his promises and assurances, not by a given structure or order. The events of a particular history are Israel's Credo (cf., Deut. 26:5 ff.;

6:20–24; Josh. 24:5–9; Pss. 106; 136). In the cult these events are treasured and remembered and rehearsed, transmitted from generation to generation, and celebrated on the great festival days. On these occasions the past becomes contemporary; the reality of the past event is not denied but it is experienced *now*. The present actuality of the historical event is superbly stated in Deuteronomy: "It was not your fathers with whom I made this covenant, but with you, yourselves, alive, here, today, all of you" (Deut. 5:3). The festivals had their original home in nature; in time they were all transformed into historical celebrations: the exodus from Egypt in the Passover, the giving of the Law of Sinai in the Feast of Weeks; the sojourn in the wilderness in the Feast of Booths. Israel thus remembers all that God has done for her in her behalf, and the New Testament joins with the Old in its confessional recital of the mighty redemptive acts from the call of Abraham to the coming of Jesus, whom it believes to be the messiah, and its beliefs concerning him are fashioned from memories enshrined in the Old Testament.[25]

In the practices of the cult we have seen how Israel enters into relation with the sacred and unique events of her election-covenant history.[26] The memories of the past become cultic rituals and dramatic celebrations. But they do more than merely repeat or make contemporary the gracious events that had been vouchsafed to her. They remind her of her responsibility before God. For the *kerygma* of the saving act is accompanied by the *torah* or *didache* of responsibility. Since Yahweh has of his own unmotivated goodness acted for Israel, so Israel must respond by acting and living in accordance with his holy will. Professor Eichrodt in his little monograph on Man in the Old Testament opens his discussion with "the unconditional obligation of the will of God as the basis of the Old Testament view of man." Yahweh's great act of deliverance at the Exodus is the ground and motive

[25] See the article on "The Faith of Israel," by G. Ernest Wright in The Interpreter's Bible, Vol. I, pp. 349–389 for an application of this confessional history to a statement of biblical theology.

[26] For an important statement of the relationship of time to the cult, see Gerhard von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testaments, Vol. II (Munich, 1960), pp. 115 ff. "Ja man koennte vielleicht noch einen Schritt weiter gehen und die kultische Festzeit als die einzige Zeit in vollen Sinn des Wortes bezeichnen; weil doch nur sie im hoechsten Sinn des Wortes 'gefuellte Zeit' war . . . ," p. 116.

for Israel's obedience. At the head of the Elohistic decalog and Covenant Code, the *kerygma* is stated: "I am Yahweh who brought you up out of the land of Egypt," and immediately there follow all the commands and obligations which are laid upon Israel (Exod. 20:1–17). This responsibility is magnificently affirmed in the Shema:

> Hear, O Israel: the LORD your God is one LORD; and you shall love the LORD your God with all your heart and with all your soul (*nephesh*) and with all your might. And these words which I command you this day shall be upon your heart; and you shall teach them diligently to your children, and shall talk of them when you sit in the house, and when you walk by the way, and when you lie down, and when you rise. And you shall bind them upon your hand, and they shall be as frontlets between your eyes. And you shall write them on the doorposts of your house and on your gates.

Even today the devout Jew recites the Shema twice each day in love (כעתים באהבה). Prophet and priest are one in making known what it is that Yahweh requires, and the apostle Paul, who appears to be most rigorous in his criticism of the Torah, is nevertheless careful to end his letters with a series of *halakoth*. Professor Eichrodt has stated Israel's responsibility in time and for time succinctly: [27]

> It is evident that there is no room in this view for a self-contained and harmoniously rounded life, for the shaping of personality into a work of art in accordance with the demands of the ideal of the kalon kagathon. It has been rightly observed that the Old Testament has no heroes or saints. It is too vividly aware of God's constant questioning of man, and calling him in question, to allow any confidence to be established in an ideal image of human personality at rest in itself. History is a movement effected by God which challenges man and gives him his destiny and his task. In this situation time cannot become a matter of indifference, as merely the material form of life over which rises, as man's real home, the reality of the spirit with its regular and ordered world. But time becomes rather the unrecurring reality which is given by God and which urges man to a decision; the reality which inexorably calls for a decision here and now and permits no rest in some secure position which is valid once for all.

[27] Walther Eichrodt, Man in the Old Testament, p. 27.

Israel's living relation with the concrete events of time is expressed in memory and expectation. From the very beginning the sanctuaries served as repositories of sacred memories; indeed, the sanctuaries are legitimized and recognized as holy because it was in these places that God had made himself known to his chosen servants in theophanic revelation. The ἱεροὶ λόγοι spoken on these occasions are treasured and remembered, rehearsed and transmitted from generation to generation. Thus the solidarity of Israel is maintained by a common memory of redemptive acts. The festivals celebrate them, and in their dramatic representations they are made contemporary. From one end of the Bible to the other the faithful are supported by the memories of what God has done for his people.

Yet it would be an error to suppose that biblical faith is primarily one of recollection of past events. Rather, throughout Scripture, the movement is generally toward the future. The promises of God to the patriarchs, to Israel, to David, and to the prophets constitute a living and dynamic impetus toward future realization. Yahweh has his plan, and his plan overcomes the plans of even the most powerful (Isa. 14:24–27; 23:8–9; Jer. 29:11; Zech. 8:14b). Yahweh has his purpose, and his purpose will be fulfilled (Isa. 44:28; 46:11). The Day of Yahweh, whether it be of light or of darkness, will come, and it is a day full of destiny. The *Heilsgeschichte* demanded fulfilment. Israel's election in the event of the Exodus was the opening event which would in God's time yield fruition. The covenant from the beginning had at its center the time when it would find realization. The land was held provisionally; it was given as a conditional inheritance, but the later prophets at least look forward to a time of Israel's return to Zion, the city of her God.

A study of the terminology of expectation shows that it emerges usually in times of social upheaval and insecurity. It is remarkable how such words as *wait* and *hope* increase in number and in depth in the period of the decline and fall of Judah. This is superbly illustrated in Jeremiah. Yahweh is Israel's Hope as he is her Savior (Jer. 14:8; 17:13). The prophet is able to overcome the despair and disappointment of exile by his faith that the future is the gracious gift of God as the events of the past

had been his gifts. "For I know the plans I plan for you, says the LORD, plans for welfare and not for evil, to give you a future and a hope." [28] In many passages of the Psalter hope comes near to expressing the heart of piety (cf., e.g., 42:5, 11; 43:5; 71:14; 119:49, 81, 114; 130:5; 146:5; 147:5). This close relation of faith and hope, especially in times when the assumed continuities are severed, is expressed in Lamentations:

> The LORD is my portion, says my soul,
> therefore I will hope in him.
> The LORD is good to those who wait for him,
> to the soul that seeks him.
> It is good that one should wait quietly,
> for the salvation of the LORD.
> (Lam. 3:24–26.)

Thus Israel participates in future time.

An examination of the verb *to wait* shows an equally profound identification with revealed time, i.e., time in which Yahweh is at work and in which he will fulfil his will and purpose. In a time of rejection, the prophet Isaiah waits for the LORD "who is hiding his face from the house of Jacob" (Isa. 8:17), and Habakkuk confronted with the dark mystery of theodicy receives the divine word:

> For still the vision awaits its time;
> it hastens to the end — it will not lie.
> If it seem slow, wait for it;
> it will surely come, it will not delay. (Hab. 2:3.)

Similarly in Second Isaiah's eschatology the motif of waiting appears again and again. It is Job's perplexity that he cannot

[28] Jer. 29:11; cf. also 31:17: "There is hope for your future, says the LORD, and your children shall come back to their own country." It should be added that both of these passages are considered late by some scholars. See Walther Eichrodt, "Heilserfahrung und Zeitverstaendnis im Alten Testament," Theologische Zeitschrift, 12 Jahrgang (1956), pp. 103–125. "Das enge Verhaeltnis von Offenbarung und Geschichte bekommt seinen unmissverstaendlichen Ausdruck in der Beschreibung des Handelns Gottes als Ausfuehrung eines Heilsplanes, durch den die Offenbarung in der Geschichte zu ihrem Ziel gebracht wird. Von Gottes Heilsplan aber kann nicht anders geredet werden als durch den Hinweis auf bestimmte Punkte in der Zeit, die sich durch ihre besondere Bedeutung aus dem allgemeinen Zeitlauf herausheben und zu Marksteinen eines fortschreitenden Handelns Gottes zur Erreichung seines Zieles werden" (p. 106).

wait or hope. To Job's desperate grappling with the final mystery of the divine ways, the apostle Paul presents a remarkable contrast. He sees the whole creation waiting with eager longing for the revealing of the sons of God, and he has learned that "if we hope for what we do not see, we wait for it with patience"; so he rejoices in hope (Rom. 8:24 f., 35–39; 15:13), and relates it to "his idea of the Spirit as an 'earnest' of full redemption hereafter." In I Peter hope is almost equivalent to faith, and it is worth noticing that this writing, too, is born in a time of darkness and despair. And for the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, "we have this as a sure and steadfast anchor of the soul, a hope that enters into the inner shrine behind the curtain where Jesus has gone as a forerunner on our behalf" (Heb. 6:19–20a).[29]

Finally, what is the biblical view of eternity, and how is it to be conceived? That God is transcendent to man's time is clear enough, but is this transcendence to be understood as timelessness? Does the Bible know any "infinite qualitative distinction between time and eternity"? These are questions which are not easily answered, and we must be prepared for great diversity of usage in both the Old and the New Testaments. The following comments are not only brief and inadequate but also very tentative.

1. The vocabulary of eternity is as extensive as that of time. The time consciousness of Israel is richly reflected in the many words and expressions used for both time and eternity. The most important and most common word is עולם, which in late Hebrew, like the Greek *αἰών*, has the dual meaning of world and eternity. On the face of it, at least, this would suggest that eternity and the duration of the world are identified.[30]

2. עולם is usually derived from the verb עלם, meaning "to hide" (cf., von Orelli and others: "die verborgene unbekannte Zeit"), but more recently scholars like J. Barth, G. R. Driver, and Wheeler Robinson derive it from a cognate of Accadian

[29] Millar Burrows, An Outline of Biblical Theology (Philadelphia, 1946), p. 247.

[30] Wheeler Robinson, Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testament, p. 118, quotes with approval Sasse's words in Kittel's Theologisches Woerterbuch zum N.T., Vol. I, p. 202: "This doubled meaning which *aion* shares with *'olam* points back to a conception of eternity in which eternity and the duration of the world are identified." It is very doubtful, however, whether *'olam* has the meaning of world in the O.T.; rather it represents a later development.

ullānu, "to be remote." In a valuable monograph on the word עולם (originally *ālamu*) Ernst Jenni demonstrates that the etymology of the word is uncertain, but that the extra-biblical usage permits the basic meaning of "farthest time." [31] This remoteness can refer either to past or future, i.e., remoteness from the present. For example, the prehistoric giants (Gen. 6:4), Israel's ancestors (Josh. 24:2), the mountains (Gen. 49:26; Deut. 33:15), and the doors of the temple (Ps. 24:7, 9) are all described as עולם; similarly in reference to the future: the sun and moon (Ps. 89:26–37), the earth (Ps. 104:5; 148:6 and often), and destruction (Exod. 14:13; Isa. 25:2). It is obvious that the term in these instances and many hundreds more does not refer to endless duration although Wheeler Robinson thinks that we have here a virtual transition from that which is very remote to that which is permanent, i.e., "forever." Dan. 12:2–3 may be such an instance, but none of the texts cited by Robinson seems to me convincing.

3. The word "eternity" seldom stands alone as an independent attribute of God, but is characteristically associated with other terms, above all with life. Yahweh is a living God who does not die (cf. the true text of Hab. 1:12). Yahweh lives forever. His eternity transcends all things. In comparison with him the heavens and the earth and the mountain fastnesses are transitory. Yet it must be remembered that precisely the same word עולם is used of God as is used of these. We are not denying God's transcendence over man's time, but we are stressing the importance of careful philological exegesis.

4. In a strict sense eternity belongs only to God. Such "eternity" as is attributed to the things of heaven and earth, the stars which shine forever and ever and the ruin of cities, is granted by God himself. Like holiness, eternity has its source only in God. In the classic expression of man's transitoriness and God's eternity we read:

> LORD, thou hast been our dwelling place in all generations,
> Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst
> formed the earth and the world,

[31] Ernst Jenni, Das Wort 'olam im Alten Testament (Berlin W 35, 1953), p. 25.

Even from everlasting to everlasting thou art God.
(Ps. 90:1.)

But Wheeler Robinson admits that the familiar phrase עולם מעולם ועד here means "from the remotest past to the remotest future," and it is difficult to see how this can be denied. In Second Isaiah, however, we have for the first time an all-inclusive association of Yahweh's relation to time and space:

Yahweh is the eternal God
Creator of the ends of the earth. (Isa. 40:28.)

Otto Eissfeldt comments on this verse: "God created all space and stands above all time." [32] Similarly Robinson: "He is set above the limitations of time as well as of space." This certainly goes without saying, for it is precisely the point toward which the whole poem is leading.

5. It is obvious, then, that in the biblical view God precedes creation and endures beyond it. Indeed, he is infinitely before man's time and infinitely after it. But there is the further question which the philosopher and theologian inevitably raises: what is the nature of God's existence antecedent and posterior to time? We repeat that God brings man's time into existence and brings it to an end. But this is not to say that he is timeless. The situation in the New Testament is much more difficult than in the Old, and many scholars find support in the former for faith in God's timelessness. Recent controversy has raged about this point, chiefly in connection with Cullmann's Christ and Time. Karl Barth (Dogmatik. II. Part I, 1940) stresses the temporal quality of eternity, and Cullmann states categorically, "Primitive Christianity knows nothing of a timeless God. The 'eternal' God is he who was in the beginning, is now, and will

[32] Geschichtliches und Uebergeschichtliches im Alten Testament. Theologische Studien und Kritiken. Beitraege zur Theologie und Religionswissenschaft. Band 109. 2. Heft, p. 28: "Bewusst hat der Prophet hier die Praeditake "Ewig" und "Schöpfer der ganzen Erde" nebeneinander gestellt, weil beiden zusammen erst die ganze, von allem Irdischen grundverschiedene Art und Machtfuelle seines Gottes zum Ausdruck bringt: die Raueme, Gott hat sie geschaffen, und die Zeit, Gott steht ueber ihr. Wichtig ist . . . diese Stelle auch darum, weil sie zeigt, dass Gottes Ewigkeit nicht etwas ist, was er fuer sich behalten will, sondern ein Wert, der seinem Volk, also Menschen, zugute kommen soll."

be in all the future, 'who is, who was, and who will be' (Rev. 5:4). Accordingly, his eternity must be expressed in this 'naïve' way, in terms of endless time." [33] Yet there are passages in Paul and in the Fourth Gospel which seem to point beyond this. Eternal life is understood as qualitatively different from the temporality of life here and now. But can we be sure that even here the meaning of "eternal" excludes time? To say that time and eternity are qualitatively different is not to say that the contrast is between time and not-time. What God's reality is like apart from time is a mystery not only forever veiled from us, but one which does not belong to the givenness of our human situation or the givenness of revelation. To the school-boy question as to what God was doing before the creation, Luther's answer is still the best: "He went into the woods to cut rods from which to punish good-for-nothing questioners!"

6. Yet if we cannot give anything like a decisive answer as to God's existence in time or in timelessness, Scripture is eloquent from beginning to end that eternity is filled with content as time is filled with content. His name endures forever and ever, and it is blessed forever and ever. His word is everlasting (Isa. 40:3–5) and moves through all time from beginning to end. His kingdom is an everlasting kingdom, and his dominion endures to all generations (Ps. 145:13; cf., Exod. 15:18; Ps. 10:16; 29:10). He makes for David an everlasting covenant (II Sam. 23:5), and the new covenant of peace shall never be removed (Isa. 54:10; 55:3). His covenant faithfulness (RSV: "steadfast love") endures forever, and in the life of the cult his eternity is felt and known as transcending all things mundane and cosmic. Many other such passages might be cited. While the philosopher will be inclined to press the question further beyond these limits, for the ordinary man the confidence that "our times are in his hand," that all times are under his gracious dominion, that he lives eternally and slumbers not, is sufficient to withstand the gales of stormy weather, all the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. Yet this must be added: it is conceivable and possible that at this point Greek thought had a major contribution to make to the problem. Augustine's treatment of the problem

[33] Christ and Time, p. 63.

shows a profound wrestling of mind with biblical categories, but it is obvious that Greek thought has contributed to its final resolution.

7. Into the large and important question of the ages, not only this present age (העולם הזה) and the coming age (העולם הבא), but all the ages, we cannot enter, and I am quite aware of the scandal of its omission both for New Testament and later Jewish thought. But for the New Testament Jesus is confessed to be the Coming One, introducing the New Age, the messiah of Israel: ὅτι πεπλήρωται ὁ καιρὸς καὶ ἤγγικεν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ. The apostle Paul describes the whole creation travailing "until now," "and not only the creation, but we ourselves, who have the first fruits of the Spirit, groan inwardly as we wait for adoption as sons, the redemption of our bodies." "For," he continues, "in this hope we are saved" and "we wait for it with patience" (Rom. 8:23–25).

OXYRHYNCHUS PAPYRUS 655 RECONSIDERED

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Among the sensational Oxyrhynchus finds from the turn of the twentieth century were several mutilated papyri which contained non-canonical sayings of Jesus.[1] Because of the fragmentary nature of much of this new material, scholarly reconstructions often were necessary to fill the lacunae and give sense to the larger fragments. In many cases, there was no known parallel material by which such restorations could be guided.

The mid-twentieth century has had its own share of sensational discoveries, not the least of which is the "Gospel of Thomas" from Nag-Hammadi.[2] In logia 1–6(or 7^a), 26–33(and 77^b), and 36–39, G.Thom. provides Coptic parallels to P.Ox. 654, 1, and 655 respectively. Now for the first time, there is a control by which to evaluate and correct the previous work on these papyri as well as an incentive to attempt new restorations of some badly mutilated fragments which previously had defied identification.[3]

[1] The Oxyrhynchus Papyri [= P.Ox.] have been published in many parts since 1898 (part 25 in 1959) by B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt, et al. An enormous literature has grown up around the material which is directly relevant to the study of Jesus' "unwritten" sayings (agrapha); see the extensive bibliography in J. A. Fitzmyer, "The Oxyrhynchus *Logoi* of Jesus and the Coptic Gospel According to Thomas," Theological Studies 20 (1959), pp. 555–560.

[2] Photographic plates of the Gospel [= G.Thom.] were published by P. Labib, Coptic Gnostic Papyri in the Coptic Museum at Old Cairo I (1956), plates 80:10–99:28. Unless otherwise indicated, the numbering of the logia and their translation (with slight adaptations) are taken from A. Guillaumont, et al., The Gospel according to Thomas (1959).

[3] In the following discussion, reference will be made to several authors who have contributed in one way or another to the study of P.Ox. 655. For the convenience of the reader, we will list here (in alphabetical order according to author) that literature; henceforth only the name of the author (or initials in the case of Grenfell and Hunt) will be cited to indicate the source in which the contribution is found:

Prof. Allen [of Oxford], Note in the Guardian of July 24, 1904 [quoted by P. Batiffol in Revue Biblique 1 (1904), p. 491];

J. A. Fitzmyer, "The Oxyrhynchus *Logoi* of Jesus and the Coptic Gospel According to Thomas," Theological Studies 20 (1959), pp. 543–551;

R. M. Grant and D. N. Freedman, The Secret Sayings of Jesus (1960), pp. 51–52;

Extra-canonical parallels	*G.Thom. (plate 87:24–88:1)*		*P.Ox. 655, col. i*	
	36 Jesus said: Take no thought from morning until evening and from evening until morning	(a)	τε ά]πὸ πρωὶ ἕ[ως ὀψὲ μήτ]ε ἀφ' ἑσπ[έρας ἕως π]ρωὶ μήτε[τεῖ τροφεῖ ὑ]μῶν τί φα[-	(a)
	what you shall put on.	(a)	γητε μήτε]τεῖ στ[ο- λεῖ ὑμῶν]τί ἐνδύ[-	
		(b)	ση]σθε .[πολ]λῷ κρεί[σ- σον]ές[ἐστε]τῶν[κρί- νων ἄτι[να ο]ὐ ξα[ί-	
			νει οὐδε ν[ή θ]ει .[ἀλλ' ἓν ἔχοντ[ες ἔ]νδ[υ-	(a)
			μα τί ἐν[δεῖτε]καὶ ὑμεῖς; τίς ἂν προσθη ἐπὶ τὴν εἰλικίαν	(b)
			ὑμῶν; αὐτὸ[ς δ]ώσει ὑμεῖν τὸ ἔνδυμα ὑ-	
	37 His disciples said: When will you be revealed to us and when will we see you? Jesus said: When you disrobe without being ashamed,		μῶν. λέγουσιν αὐ- τῷ οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ· πότε ἡμεῖν ἐμφα- νὴς ἔσει καὶ πότε σε ὀψόμεθα; λέγει []· ὅταν ἐκδύσησθε καὶ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆτε[,]	
Clement of Alexandria, Strom. III:13:92 ὅταν τὸ τῆς αἰσχύνης ἔνδυμα πατήσητε . . . (G. Egyptians).	and take your clothes and put them under your feet as the little children and tread on them, then [shall you behold] the Son of the Living (One)		[καὶ λάβητε τὸ ἔν- δυμα ὑμῶν καὶ θῆτε [αὐτὸ ὑπὸ τοὺς πό- δας ὑμῶν ὡς τὰ παι- δία καὶ πατήσητε [ἐπ' αὐτό, τότε τὸν υἱ- ὸν τοῦ ζῶντος ὄψεσ-	]]]]]]

Col. i — fragment (a) extends from lines 1–11 on the right; (b) begins in line 7 on the left and continues through line 23. There is no direct contact of (a) with (b).

Line 1: the final words of the preceding column are doubtless λέγει Ἰς· μὴ μεριμνᾶτε.

5: incorrectly transcribed as THCT by G-H: TЄI is an orthographic peculiarity.

4–17: the absence of most of this material in G.Thom. is strange, but may reflect a deliberate omission since the following logion emphasizes *lack* of clothing, while this section in P.Ox. 655 seems to teach the sufficiency of "one garment" which "he himself will give you." On the other hand, the Coptic may be the more original form; see the discussions of the problem in Fitzmyer, p. 544, and Grant-Freedman, p. 69.

10: the beginning of another letter in (a) is visible, and seems to be Λ, Δ, or Λ.

13–19: orthographic peculiarities are to be noted in lines 14 (=ἡλικίαν), 16 (=ὑμῖν), and 19 (=ἡμῖν). G-H correct the last word in line 13 to read προσθείη (optative), but it could be taken as subjunctive (προσθῇ).

17f.: the Coptic has no equivalent for αὐτῷ, and transliterates μαθητής.

21: two small holes in the papyrus at the end of this line might have contained the letters Ἰς (as in G.Thom.), although this is improbable.

22: the Coptic transliterates ὅταν.

23: the lacuna at the end of this line has room enough for two more letters, but probably not enough room for ΚΑΙ.

24–30: possibly τὰ ἐνδύματα . . . αὐτὰ . . . αὐτά would be better here (see n. 10).

29: the Coptic transliterates τότε; on the lacuna in G.Thom., see n. 10,

P.Ox. 665, col. ii	*G.Thom. (plate 88:1–17)*	*Extra-canonical parallels*
θ[ε καὶ μὴ φοβεῖσθε.	and you shall not fear.	*Iren., AH I:20:2* (=*Epiph., Pan. 34:18:13*)
λέ[γει αὐτοῖς Ἰσ· π-	38 Jesus said: Many	πολλάκις
ο[λλάκις ἐπεθυμήσα-	times have you desired	ἐπεθύμησα ἀκοῦσαι
τ[ε ἀκοῦσαι τοὺς λό-	to hear these words	ἕνα τῶν λόγων τούτων,
γ[ους οὓς λέγω ὑμεῖν,	which I say to you,	καὶ οὐκ ἔσχον
κα[ὶ οὐκ ἔχετε τὸ-	and you have no other	τὸν ἐροῦντα
ν [ἐροῦντα αὐτούς.	from whom to hear them.	(Marcosian logion).
κα[ὶ ἐλεύσονται αἱ	There will be	*Cyp., Test. III:29* (*MS W*)
ἡμ[έραι ὅταν ζητή-	days when you will	Veniet enim tempus et quaeretis me et vos et qui post vos venerint audire verbum sapientiae et intellectus, et non invenietis ("Baruch"[?]).
σε[τέ με καὶ οὐ μὴ	seek me (and) you will not	*Ps-Clem. Hom. 18:15:7–16:2*
[εὑρήσετέ με. λέγει]	39 find me. Jesus said:	παρ' αὐτοῖς γὰρ ἡ κλεὶς
['Ισ· οἱ Φαρισαῖοι]	The Pharisees	τῆς βασιλείας τῶν οὐρα-
[καὶ οἱ Γραμματεῖς]	and the Scribes	νῶν ἀπέκειτο, τουτέστιν,
ἔλ[αβον τὰς κλεῖδας	have received the keys	ἡ γνῶσις, τῶν ἀπορρήτων.
τῆς[γνώσεως, αὐτοὶ ἔ-	of knowledge; they have	. . . ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἀπέ-
κρυψ[αν αὐτάς. οὔτε	hidden them. They did not	κρυπτον τὴν γνῶσιν τῆς
εἰσῆλ[θον, οὔτε τοὺς	enter, and they did not	βασιλείας καὶ οὔτε αὐτοὶ
εἰσερ[χομένους ἀφῆ-	let those (enter)	εἰσῆλθαν οὔτε τοῖς
καν [εἰσελθεῖν. ὑμεῖς	who wished. But you,	βουλομένοις εἰσελθεῖν
δὲ γεί[νεσθε φρόνι-	become wise	παρέσχον . . . .
μοι ὡ[ς ὄφεις καὶ ἀ-	as serpents and	
κέραι[οι ὡς περιστε-	innocent as doves.	
ρα[ί. λέγει Ἰσ· . . .	40 Jesus said: A vine	
. . . .	has been planted without	
	the Father and, as it	
	is not established, it will	
	be pulled up by its roots	
	41 and be destroyed. Jesus said:	
	Whoever has in his hand	
	to him shall be given;	

l. ii — fragment (c) extends from lines 1–10 along the left margin; (b) begins at line 14 and continues through line 23.

Line 2: the letters ΛΕ protrude slightly into the margin of the papyrus. This could possibly indicate the start of a new logion, although there is no clear precedent for this in P.Ox. 655; contrast col. i, line 21, and P.Ox. 1.

2f.: if *πολλάκις* is correct (and it is admittedly unusual to divide a word in such a manner), something must be supplied to fill out line 2. Precedent for *αὐτοῖς* is found in G.Thom. 12, 14, 22, etc. The Coptic transliterates *ἐπιθυμεῖν*.

6f.: such a division of *τόν* is also unusual, but alternative reconstructions are equally beset with difficulties (*καὶ ἄλλος οὐκ ἔστι/ν οὗ ἀκοῦσαι τούτων* ?).

8: the Coptic has no equivalent for *καί*.

12f.: the Coptic transliterates *Φαρισαῖος* and *Γραμματεύς*.

15f.: the Coptic transliterates *γνῶσις* and *οὔτε* (this does not guarantee that the latter stood in the Greek text).

20off.: the Coptic transliterates *δέ*, *φρόνιμος* and *ἀκέραιος*.

20: the papyrus has ΤΘΙ in accord with the orthographical peculiarities already noted in col. i, lines 3–6 and 13–19 (see also the restoration in col. ii, line 5). Modern editors would prefer to read *γίνεσθε*.

This article contains a fragment by fragment discussion of one of these papyri, number 655, with the following goals in view: (1) briefly to describe the progressive study of P.Ox. 655 since its discovery in 1903; (2) to evaluate and supplement this past work in the light of the newly discovered G.Thom. and a first-hand re-examination of the papyrus fragments; and finally, (3) to present the larger fragments of P.Ox. 655 in such a way that the

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B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt [=G-H], Oxyrhynchus Papyri IV (1904), pp. 22–28;

G. Heinrici, "Die neuen Herrensprueche," Theologische Studien und Kritiken 78 (1905), pp. 205–209;

A. Hilgenfeld, "Neue gnostische Logia Jesu," Zeitschrift fuer Wissenschaftliche Theologie 47 (1904), pp. 567–573;

O. Hofius, "Das Koptische Thomasevangelium und die Oxyrhynchus-Papyri Nr. 1, 654 und 655; II," Evangelische Theologie 20 (1960), pp. 189–192;

R. Kasser, "Les Manuscrits de Nag 'Hammâdi," Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie 9 (1959), 351–370;

P. Katz, "ΠΩΣ ΑΤΞΑΝΟΥΣΙΝ. Matt. VI. 28," Journal of Theological Studies 5 (1954), pp. 207–209;

E. Klostermann, Apocrypha II: Evangelien (Kleine Texte 6, 1929[3]), pp. 23–24;

J. A. H. Michelsen, "Nieuw-ontdekte fragmenten van evangeliën," Teyler's Theologisch Tijdschrift 3(1905), pp. 161–164, and "Uittreksels uit het Evangelie volgens Thomas," ibid. 7(1909), pp. 214–233.

G. Osborn, [short note], Journal of Theological Studies 32 (1930/31), p. 179;

H. C. Puech, "Gnostische Evangelien und verwandte Dokumente: Das Thomas-Evangelium," in Neutestamentliche Apokryphen I: Evangelien, ed. E. Hennecke and W. Schneemelcher (1959[3]), pp. 199–223;

T. C. Skeat, "The Lilies of the Field," Zeitschrift fuer die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft 37 (1938), pp. 211–214;

A. de Santos Otero [=Santos], Los Evangelios Apocrifos (1956), pp. 81–83;

W. Schneemelcher, "Papyrusfragmente apokrypher Evangelien: Oxyrhynchos-Papyrus 655," in Neutestamentliche Apokryphen I [see above under Puech], pp. 70–72;

C. Taylor, The Oxyrhynchus Sayings of Jesus (1905), pp. 18–23;

T. Zahn, "Neue Funde aus der alten Kirche," Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift 16 (1905), pp. 96–101.

The relationship between P.Ox. 655 and G.Thom. is discussed by Fitzmyer, Grant-Freedman, Hofius, Kasser, Puech, and Schneemelcher. Most recently, G. Garitte, "Les 'Logoi' d'Oxyrhynque et l'apocryphe copte dit 'Évangile de Thomas'," Le Muséon 73 (1960), pp. 151–172, has challenged the assumption that G.Thom. basically is a translation from a Greek original which was roughly identical with the P.Ox. parallels, and suggests, *per contra*, that P.Ox. 654, 1, and 655 are translations from a Coptic *Vorlage* like G.Thom. (he leaves open the question as to whether G.Thom. *originally* was written in Greek or in Coptic). A. Guillaumont, "Les *Logoi* d'Oxyrhynchos sont traduits du copte?" ibid., pp. 325–333, considers Garitte's hypothesis to be improbable, especially in the light of the complex textual situation involved (note that the P.Ox. fragments are from three different manuscripts and do not parallel G.Thom. exactly at every point, etc.), but Garitte's answer ("Les 'Logoi' d'Oxyrhynque sont traduits du copte," ibid., pp. 335–349) attempts to reaffirm and strengthen his earlier claims.

original structure of this part of the papyrus may be seen more clearly. The major conclusions of this examination are synthesized in the reconstruction of P.Ox. 655 found on pp. 254–55. Constant reference to these pages, where we have renumbered the lines of the papyrus to accord with their column structure, will be necessary in reading the discussions of each fragment.

P.Ox. 655 consists of eight fragments from a Greek scroll which probably was written before the middle of the third century A.D. Only two of these fragments, (a) and (b), were extensive enough to allow their original editors to suggest tentative reconstructions, and on the basis of this material P.Ox. 655 misleadingly came to be labeled as a "Fragment of a Lost Gospel" (in contrast to P.Ox. 1 and 654, "Sayings of our Lord").[4] The largest fragment is (b), consisting of parts of two columns in which the average line length for the first column was 14–15 letters. Fragment (a) contains parts of eleven lines from the top of a column, while (c) has the first, or at most the first two, letters of ten lines from the top of another column. Fragment (d) has some sixteen letters from the ends of five lines at the bottom of a column, and (e) has two letters from the last line of a column. G-H also transcribed three smaller fragments, (f), (g), and (h), in which they positively identified a total of only three letters, and tentatively identified three other letters (the facsimile of the papyrus in G-H IV, plate II, does not include these three scraps).[5]

Column i, fragments (*a*) and (*b*). In general, the reconstruction of col. i in G-H (made with the help of Mr. Badham) required little modification in the ensuing years. Matt. 6:25–34 and Luke 12:22–31 provided ready parallels for most of the material. G-H recognized that "στ[ολῆ in ll. 5–6 is not quite the word that would be expected," but could suggest no more

[4] Grenfell and Hunt [=G–H]. It should be noted, however, that already in 1909, Michelsen had suggested that all three of the P.Ox. fragments had come from a lost G.Thom. P.Ox. 655 now is in the possession of the Semitic Museum at Harvard University, and is housed at Houghton Library in Cambridge, Mass., under the catalogue number SM 4367.

[5] Fragments (f) and (h) apparently have been lost in subsequent years, for they were not with the other portions of P.Ox. 655 when Mr. Roy B. Ward and the author recently remounted the papyrus for the Semitic Museum. The content of these smaller scraps is, according to the transcriptions of G–H, the letters KA in (f), K and AI in the two lines of (g), and Є in (h).

convincing alternative. Subsequent examinations have failed to produce a better solution (the orthography must be changed to στολεῖ in the light of the article which is τεῖ, not τῇ as G-H transcribed it[6]). Lines 9–13[a] presented the greatest problem for G-H in col. i. Their restoration is ἄτι[να α]ὐξά/νει οὐδὲ ν[ήθ]ει .[.]/ ἓν ἔχοντ[ες ἔ]νδ[υ]/μα τί ἐν[....] καὶ/ ὑμεῖς, but they comment that "there are many points of uncertainty" — "οὐδὲ ν[ήθ]ει . . . is not very satisfactory," while ἐν[δεῖτε] seems to be suggested in line 12, but this "does not suit τί."

In 1905, C. Taylor (p. 19) suggested that a better reading for lines 10–13 would be καὶ (or ἀλλ') ἓν ἔχοντα ἔνδυμα τί ἐνδεῖ; καὶ ὑμεῖς . . . , "with τί as a solecism (acc. for gen.)" — it is the lilies which have but one garment! In the same year, T. Zahn (p. 97, n. 1) suggested μηδὲν ἔχοντα ἔνδυμα. τί ἐνδύεσθε καὶ ὑμεῖς as another alternative — the lilies have *no* garment. Fitzmyer combined the Zahn reading in lines 10–11 with τί ἐνδεῖτε καὶ ὑμεῖς in line 12, while most other commentators[7] have followed G-H. It is in lines 9–10, however, that a most convincing correction of G-H was offered by T. C. Skeat in 1938.[8] To supply the negative construction which, by implication, should precede the οὐδέ of line 10, Skeat suggested ἄτινα οὐ ξαίνει οὐδὲ νήθει ("which neither card nor spin"). His close scrutiny of Codex Sinaiticus in Matt. 6:28 revealed the fact that its original text once contained the similar reading, οὐ ξένουσιν (later "corrected" to αὐξάνουσιν ["they grow"]), which undoubtedly is more original to the synoptic tradition. Skeat's observation seems to have been overlooked by Santos and Fitzmyer.

A synthesis of these suggestions provides the following translation for col. i, lines 7–17 (which are completely lacking in the

[6] This is a common orthographical variant and helps to lengthen lines 3–6, which otherwise would be unusually short in the reconstruction. The difference between ЄI and H is very difficult to detect in P.Ox. 655, since the vertical stroke of the Є has very little curvature.

[7] See Klostermann, p. 23; Santos, p. 82; and Grant-Freedman, p. 51. Other attempts at filling the lacunae left by G-H in lines 10 and 12 include Hilgenfeld's ὅτι . . . ἐνδύεσθε, Heinrici's ἀλλ' . . . ἐνδεῖσθε, and Michelsen's τὸ ἓν ἔχοντων . . . ἐνδεές (1909).

[8] See also the discussion of Katz. Actually, Michelsen (1909) already had suggested the same correction on the basis of the "western" variant to Luke 12:27, although he could not know of the support offered by the original hand of Sinaiticus.

G.Thom. parallel): "Of how much more worth are you than the lilies, which neither card nor spin! But since you have one garment, what, indeed, do you lack? Who of you could increase (his) stature [or, 'lengthen (his) life-span']? He shall give you (each) your garment!"

Col. ii, fragment (b). With the help of Dr. Bartlet, G-H restored the first six lines of (b) col. ii (lines 14–19 according to our numbering), but the last four lines of the same portion were left uncompleted, although 14 letters were clearly visible in the first three of these lines. Almost immediately, Allen, Heinrici, Michelsen (1905), Taylor, and Zahn correctly identified this latter section (lines 20–24) as parallel to Matt. 10:16b, and several years later, G. Osborn independently came to the same conclusion. With regard to lines 14–19, which appear in G-H as ἔλ[εγε· τὴν κλείδα]/ τῆς [γνώσεως ἐ]/κρύψ[ατε· αὐτοὶ οὐκ]/ εἰσήλ[θατε, καὶ τοῖς]/ εἰσερ[χομένοις οὐ]/κ ἀν[εῴξατε on the basis of Luke 11:52, Allen made the brilliant observations (reproduced by Santos; compare Hofius) that the reference to "the key" should be in the plural, the verbs should be in the third person (ἔκρυψαν . . . εἰσῆλθον . . . etc.; see also Michelsen [1905] and Taylor), and that lines 17–19 should read οὐδὲ τοὺς εἰσερχομένους ἀφῆκαν εἰσελθεῖν (see Matt. 23:13). This last suggestion also was offered by Michelsen (1905), and seems more natural than Fitzmyer's καὶ τοῖς εἰσερχομένοις οὐκ ἀνεῖσαν. In 1905, Michelsen even suggested οἱ γὰρ γραμματεῖς ἔλαβον at the beginning of the fragment! Other minor changes from G-H's restoration also have been necessitated by the Coptic parallel (see especially line 14).[9]

Fragment (c). Although fragment (c) did not provide enough material to make possible its reconstruction, G-H thought it "practically certain" that (c) formed the top for col. ii of fragment (b). The close similarities which obtain between G.Thom. 37[a], 39 and P.Ox. 655 fragments (a), (b) encourage the probability that G.Thom. 37[b]–38 may provide the necessary clue for restoring the lacunae at the bottom of col. i and the top of col. ii

[9] In lines 13–16, Fitzmyer follows the parallel from the Ps-Clem. Homily 18 for the verbs ἀπέλαβον . . . ἀπέκρυψαν (see also Michelsen in 1905); but compare Codex Bezae (et al.) in Luke 11:52.

in P.Ox. 655.[10] In their independent studies of P.Ox. 655 from this new perspective, both Fitzmyer and Hofius have attempted to show that fragment (c) can be made to meet the requirements of the Coptic parallel for the material at the top of col. ii. Since the reconstruction included in this note was completed in its basic outlines before the author had seen the work of Fitzmyer or Hofius, it is of value to indicate the directions in which their pioneer efforts on fragment (c) led them (independently), and to evaluate their work in the light of the present (largely independent) study:

Fitzmyer, p. 549		*Hofius, p. 191*
"We admit that our restoration is quite questionable in many places, but we propose it in the hope that someone will be fortunate enough to see more clearly and make the proper adjustments."		"The reconstruction here offered appears very precarious to me and is of value only as an experiment."
	1	[λέγει Ἰς· πολλάκις ἐπε-]
λέ[γει Ἰ(ησοῦ)ς· π-	2	θ[υμήσατε τούτους τοὺς
ο[λλάκις ἐπεθυμήσα-	3	λό[γους μου ἀκοῦσαι,
τα[ι ἀκοῦσαι τοὺς λό-	4	ο[ὓς λαλῶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς· καὶ ἔ-
γ[ους οὓς ὑμῖν λέγω	5	τε[ρον, ὅστις ἂν λέ-
κα[ὶ οὐκ ἔχετε τὸ-	6	γ[η ὑμεῖν ὥστε ἀ-
ν [ἐροῦντα ὑμῖν	7	κο[ῦσαι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, οὐδέ-
κα[ὶ ἐλεύσονται	8	ν[α οὐ μὴ ἔχετε.
ἡμ[έραι ὅτε ζητή-	9	κα[ὶ ἐλεύσονται
σ[ετέ με καὶ οὐχ εὑ-	10	ἡμ[έραι ὅτε ζητή-
[ρήσετέ με . . . .]		σε[τέ με καὶ οὐχ εὑρήσε-
		[τε . . . .]

For several reasons, not the least of which is the length of the lines, Hofius' reconstruction is impossible.[11] Fitzmyer's is almost

[10] Hofius does not attempt to restore col. i, lines 24–30, and Fitzmyer differs from our reconstruction of that section in the following particulars:
lines 24 ff.; *τοὺς χιτῶνας . . . αὐτούς . . . αὐτούς.*
Other alternatives are *ἱμάτια* and *ἐνδύματα*. We have chosen the latter (in the singular as collective, although the Coptic is plural; for a similar use of the collective singular, see W. Dittenberger, Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum III [1920³], p. 170 [1023:29 ff.] — *παραγένωνται . . . τὸ ὄνομα πατριαστί*) because it is more likely as a *Stichwort* and it occurs in the parallel from Clement of Alexandria.
lines 27 f.; *τότε γενήσεσθε υἱοὶ τοῦ ζῶντος καὶ οὐ μὴ φοβηθήσεσθε.*
The Coptic has a lacuna here for the first verb, but the word "son" is definitely in the singular, and the context of the disciples' question seems to support the translation adopted in this paper (despite the agreement of Schoedel's translation in Grant-Freedman with Fitzmyer's).

[11] Hofius also errs in reading col. ii, line 2 as ΛΟ (it is unmistakably ΛЄ, and there is no similarity between O and Є in the handwriting of the papyrus), nor can the second letter of line 6 be O (it is almost positively A). Throughout his restorations of the three P.Ox., Hofius seems to pay little attention to the average

certainly correct in its general outlines, and the θ at the beginning of line 1 also easily fits into the preceding logion, although Fitzmyer did not recognize this. Fitzmyer also correctly observed that "at least *three* blank lines must be left between fragment (c) and (b)," although in their transcription of the text, G-H left only two.[12] Similarly, the extant portions of P.Ox. 655 (as well as the facsimile in G-H) support Fitzmyer in questioning G-H's suggestion that the second letters of lines 5 and 10 were Τ and Ι respectively (the latter is almost surely an Ϲ), while the second letter of line 7 seems to begin with a circular stroke, and the second letter of line 4 is not necessarily an Α (Ϲ is equally possible). Nevertheless, G-H seem to have been correct in their instinctive judgment concerning the external relationship between fragments (c) and (b).

Fragment (d). G-H thought that fragments (d) and (e) came from "the bottom of the same two columns which are partly preserved in (b)," and tentatively identified the words φωτεινῷ (corrected by a later hand from φωτινῷ) and κόσμῳ in (d), but no further reconstruction of (d) was attempted. Although G.Thom. offers no support for locating (d) within the columns partly preserved by (b), it has been suggested that fragment (d) may parallel G.Thom. 24[b].[13] If this is correct, the restoration of the Greek is extremely difficult, if not impossible. The following attempt at reconstruction incorporates fragment (e) into the last line of (d).[14] The English translation is that of W. R. Schoedel in Grant-Freedman.

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number of letters per line; certainly there can be some flexibility here, but not the extremes found in his article!

[12] In fragment (b), the last lines of each column correspond to each other, and thus one would expect that the same number of lines preceded in each column. Nevertheless, G-H have 23 lines in the transcription of the extant fragments from col. i, but only allow for 22 lines in col. ii.

[13] Grant-Freedman, p. 52 n. 4. This identification is possible, but it is by no means positive. The main problem is how to construct reasonable Greek around the dative/locative adjective, φωτεινῷ (assuming that the copulative verb occurs at the end of the preceding line), on the basis of the Coptic context. Kasser, p. 367 n. 1, makes the following attempt: ⲈⲒ ΦΩϹ ⲈϹⲦⲒⲚ / ⲈⲚ ⲀⲚⲐⲢⲰⲠⲒⲰ ΦⲰⲦⲈⲒⲚⲰ / ⲈⲚ ⲞⲀⲰ ⲦⲰ ⲔⲞϹⲘⲰ / ΦⲰⲦⲒⲌⲈⲒ· ⲈⲒ ⲆⲈ ⲘⲎ / ⲤⲔⲞⲦⲈⲒⲚⲞϹ ⲈϹⲦⲒⲚ.

[14] G-H thought that the letters of (e) came from the beginning of a line, but the lacuna to their left is close enough to allow some letters to precede them. (They also might possibly be from the end of a line which extended into the right margin, and thus not from the bottom of a column at all!) From an exam-

G.Thom. 24b (plate 86:6–10)	*P.Ox. 655, fragments (d) and (e)*
He said to them:	
Whoever has ears,	
let him hear.	
There is light	
within a light-man	(?) . . . φῶς ἔνεσ]τιν
and it illuminates	(?) ἀνθρώτῳ τῷ φ]ωτεινῷ
the whole world [κόσμος]	(?) καὶ ὅλῳ τῷ κ]όσμῳ·
if it does not illuminate it,	ἐὰν δὲ μὴ φωτίζ]ῃ'
(it is) darkness	σ]κο[τεινός ἐ]στιν.

The original structure of P.Ox. 655. In this article, we have tried to gather together the "loose ends" in the study of P.Ox. 655 and to synthesize them with our own observations. If the reconstruction at which we have arrived is correct in its general outlines, the papyrus once contained columns of about 30 lines each, with approximately 12–16 letters per line (usually 14–15). If the original text of P.Ox. 655 contained a continuous parallel to G.Thom. 24–39, and if fragment (d) parallels G.Thom. 24^{b}, then (d) originally was separated from what we have called col. i by some 90 lines of 15 Greek letters each, or three columns of 30 lines each. The location of fragment (a) at the top of col. i and of (c) at the top of col. ii are almost surely correct, but many details in their reconstruction remain problematic. Fragments (d) and (e) do not seem to come from the same columns as (a), (b), and (c), while the remaining scraps of P.Ox. 655 could have come from almost anywhere in the original roll.[15]

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ination of the fiber grains of the papyrus fragments themselves, there is no objection to the possibility that (d) and (e) represent the bottom of the same column. At the end of the next-to-the-last line of (d) there is a perplexing little apostrophe-like hook for which no satisfactory explanation has been found.

[15] Possibly through misreading G-H, Santos has mistakenly included fragment (f) after (d) at the bottom of col. i, and has placed (h) after (e) at the bottom of col. ii. Since (d) and (e) themselves appear to be from the bottom of a column (or columns), this is impossible. Apparently Puech (p. 213) based his comments concerning the external relationship between G.Thom. and P.Ox. 655 on the erroneous order into which Santos had placed the fragments; Schneemelcher's comments on p. 72 betray a similarly misplaced confidence in Santos' order, and Hofius (p. 189) also seems to have been misled in this regard.

NEW LIGHT ON THE "CHALDAEAN ORACLES" [1]

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Hans Lewy's posthumous book, the fruit of many years' devoted study, should arouse fresh interest in one of the most tantalizingly obscure of ancient Greek texts. The Chaldaean Oracles were a divine revelation in bad hexameter verse; its authors were believed to be gods (speaking through the lips of entranced mediums?), but it was given to the world, as Lobeck guessed and Bidez finally proved, by one "Julianus the theurgist," who lived under Marcus Aurelius. It is of serious concern to historians of religion, as the last important Sacred Book of pagan antiquity, and to historians of ideas, as one of the major influences which shaped the later development of Neoplatonism from Porphyry to Psellus. Unfortunately it has come down to us only in fragments. *Verbatim* quotations from it, totalling something like 300 lines, were collected in 1894 by Wilhelm Kroll; and there exist in addition, scattered through the writings of Proclus, Damascius, Psellus and other Neoplatonists, numerous reports of its teaching and of the magical rites practiced by its adepts. Some of the latter are cited by Kroll, and others have been brought to light subsequently, especially by Bidez,[2] but they have not yet been systematically assembled.[3]

Lewy's book is the first really comprehensive examination of this material.[4] It is the more to be regretted that his death in

[1] Hans Lewy: Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy: Mysticism, Magic and Platonism in the later Roman Empire (Recherches d'Archéologie, de Philologie et d'Histoire, Tome xiii). Le Caire, Imprimerie de l'Institut d'Archéologie Orientale, 1956, pp. xxvi, 512.

[2] See the texts edited by him in Catalogue des manuscrits alchimiques grecs, vol. vi, and in Mélanges Cumont, 95 ff.

[3] Lewy made or intended making a collection of the fragments, to be printed as an appendix to his book, but it appears that no such collection was found among his papers.

[4] Kroll confined himself to a brief though extremely valuable discussion in Latin. Individual aspects of the Oracles have been studied by Bidez ("Note sur les mystères néoplatoniciens," Rev. Belge de Phil. et d'Hist., 7, 1928, 1477 ff.); by Hopfner in his Gr.-Aeg. Offenbarungszauber and elsewhere; by Theiler (Die chald. Orakel u.d. Hymnen des Synesios, 1942); by Eitrem ("La Théurgie chez

1945 prevented him from giving it the final revision which it obviously required, and that he was not there to see it through the press. For it cannot be said that he has been well served by his publishers and editors. Despite the unexplained delay of eleven years in its publication, it bears few marks of editorial care. Misprints abound everywhere,[5] and the most obvious oversights stand uncorrected,[6] as does also the author's highly idiosyncratic English (he uses queer words like "hypophet," "goët," "hypertrophic" and "parodical"). What is more serious is that a book which cries out for an index has been sent into the world with only the barest table of contents. The reader who wishes to consult the Greek text of a particular passage is dependent on a system of cross-references from one footnote to another; and unfortunately many of the cross-references are wrong. These defects of presentation make the book harder to use than it should be; but no student of later paganism can afford to neglect it on that account.

It falls into two parts. Part I begins with a chapter which argues for the ascription to the Chaldaean Oracles of about 100 lines not hitherto recognized as belonging to it. The remaining chapters of this part present a synthetic account of "Chaldaean" doctrine, while in Part II the same material is handled analytically with a view to determining the sources of the system. This is no doubt a logical arrangement, though it means that every important fragment is discussed at least twice. But it has the disadvantage that the least secure part of Lewy's material — his alleged "new fragments" — is placed in the forefront and influences his treatment of the rest. I should have preferred to

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les néoplatoniciens et dans les papyrus magiques," Symb. Oslo., 22, 1942, 49 ff.); by the present writer ("Theurgy and its Relationship to Neoplatonism," J.R.S. 37, 1947, 55 ff., reprinted in The Greeks and the Irrational, 1951, 283 ff.); and by Festugière, Rév. d'Hermès III, 1953, 52–59. It is unfortunate that only the two first-mentioned of these studies were available to Lewy.

[5] False Greek words which may puzzle the reader include *ἀγνεῖον* for *ἀγγεῖον* (p. 265), *ῥότιος* for *ῥόθιος* (p. 277), *σκυλίοισι* for *σκολίοισι* (p. 303), *κλίσεις* for *κλήσεις* (p. 469).

[6] E.g. "second person" for "first person" makes nonsense of an important passage on p. 6; *φωτί* is described as an ablative (p. 11); the 30 books of Iamblichus' commentary on the Oracles have become "30 volumes" (p. 68); on pages 10 and 88 the translation offered in the text conflicts with the explanation given in the footnote.

see it placed last. For these "new fragments" differ from the old ones in that their ascription to the Chald. Or. rests on no ancient authority (for several of them a different and incompatible origin is in fact attested), but simply on their resemblance in diction and content to attested fragments. This is a type of argument which needs to be used with caution, since (a) there was a conventional "oracle-style" to which all *soi-disant* oracles may be expected up to a point to conform; (b) the Chald. Or. belong, as Lewy himself points out (p. 312), to an age when the same religious tendencies were finding parallel expression in many different *milieux*, Stoic, Platonist, Hermetic, Gnostic or Orphic. And in fact the force of Lewy's argument seems to me to vary widely from case to case.

His "new fragments" comprise (i) a group of doctrinal oracles which are included in the Christian collection of pagan oracles known as the Tübingen Theosophia (edited by K. Buresch in his book Klaros, 1889); (ii) a group of ritual or magical oracles quoted by Eusebius from Porphyry's Philosophy of Oracles (edited by G. Wolff, Porphyrii de philosophia ex oraculis haurienda librorum reliquiae, 1856). According to Lewy, the two sources are reducible to one, since the first group were taken over by the Christian collector from Porphyry's book; but of this proposition there is no proof, save for the two oracles, nos. 27 (plus 29) and 30, which the collector expressly calls Porphyrian.[7] And in fact of all these "new fragments" Theos. 27, a 19-line hymn to the Supreme God, is the one which agrees most closely in diction and content with the attested fragments of the Chald. Or. (the agreement was already noticed by Thilo and Wolff). If we are prepared to admit (against the opinion of Bidez) that Porphyry already knew the Chald. Or. when he composed his Philosophy of Oracles[8] (as to which, see below), then we shall be strongly tempted to accept Theos. 27 as Chaldaic, though

[7] Since Porphyry is quoted as source for two oracles only, the natural inference is that the remaining oracles do *not* come from Porphyry.

[8] Acceptance of this view does not involve identifying the Philosophy of Oracles with the De regressu, as J. J. O'Meara has recently invited us to do. Lewy in fact follows the opinion of Eunapius, Bernays and Bidez that the Philosophy of Oracles is an early work from Porphyry's pre-Plotinian period: rightly, in my judgment (cf. Pierre Hadot in Rev. des Études Augustiniennes, 6, 1960, 205 ff.).

Theos. 29, which the collector presents as a continuation of 27, may arouse some doubts.[9]

For most of the other oracles in his first group Lewy's case seems to me much weaker. And for the one which is most interesting doctrinally, the Aion-oracle (Theos. 13), I find it very weak indeed. According to the Theosophia, this oracle was delivered by Apollo in answer to one Theophilus, who asked him "if he were God, or another"; according to Lactantius (who quotes part of it), it comes from the Apolline Oracle at Colophon (Claros). Lewy dismisses the latter attribution as "certainly erroneous" (p. 19, n. 46), but without sufficient reason.[10] His own attribution to a "Chaldaean" Apollo involves serious difficulty. For the author of Theos. 13 Aion is surely the Supreme God,[11] like the Iranian Zervan; but the Chald. Or. placed Aion "in the second rank of intelligibles," calling it "a light sprung from the Father."[12] Further, if we are to believe Proclus,[13] the personal Time-god whom the theurgists caused to appear in visible form, and who receives some of the epithets given to Aion in Theos. 13, was named not Aion but Chronos. Lewy suggests (p. 104) that Proclus may have substituted the name Chronos for Aion in order to avoid contradictions between the Oracles and the Timaeus; but we find *ἀκοιμήτου χρόνου*, *ἀπέραντον χρονον*, and *χρόνου χρόνος* in *verbatim* citations from the Oracles.[14] To call Aion on this evidence "the Chaldaean God par excellence" (p. 158) is surely very rash.

[9] Theos. 29 introduces the notion of a bisexual Supreme God, which I cannot find explicitly attested for the Oracles; and its description of this God as *εἶδος*, *ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα* is at least *prima facie* inconsistent with the Chaldaean transcendence-theology, though Lewy tries to reconcile them. Cf. Norden, Agnostos Theos, 228 f.; Festugière, Rév. d'Hermès, IV. 48.

[10] Cf. Picard, Ephèse et Claros, 715 ff.; Nock, R.E.A., 30 (1928), 280 ff.; Eitrem, Orakel u. Mysterien am Ausgang der Antike (Zürich, 1947), 58 ff. According to Nilsson, "the authenticity of this oracle is generally admitted, and can hardly be doubted" (Gesch. d. gr. Rel. II. 458).

[11] It is so understood by Wolff, Nock, Eitrem and Nilsson. Lines 3–4 yield little sense unless Aion is identical with the *πατὴρ μέγας* (for we surely cannot, with L., make *ἑαυτόν* refer to Aion). The *αἰών* and *αἰῶνες* of line 13 I take to be world-periods, whose sequence is governed by *θεὸς αὐτός*, the Supreme God Aion: cf. P.G.M., xii. 246 *Αἰὼν αἰῶνα τρέφων αἰῶσιν ἀνάσσει.*

[12] Dam., Dub. II. 21.15; Proc., in Tim. III. 14.3. This Chaldaean Aion strikes one as an abstraction rather than a personal god.

[13] In Tim. III. 20.22, 43.11; cf. Simp., Phys. 795.4.

[14] Kroll, pp. 24, 25, 33.

For his second group of "new fragments," the ritual oracles from Porphyry's book, Lewy makes in general [15] a somewhat stronger case. He rightly interprets them as trance utterances, delivered in the first person by a "god" through a human medium,[16] connects them with theurgic ritual practice, and calls attention to various points of agreement with known fragments of the Chald. Or. Was Bidez then mistaken in assuming that Porphyry had not yet "discovered" the Chald. Or. when he wrote the Philosophy of Oracles? Lydus, de mensibus 4.53, which Lewy quotes on p. 9, does not prove him mistaken: for Lydus' *ὑπόμνημα τῶν λογίων* may well represent, not the Philosophy of Oracles, but (as Bidez thought) the commentary *εἰς τὰ Ἰουλιανοῦ τοῦ Χαλδαίου* which Suidas lists among Porphyry's works. It may seem odd, however, that an oracle-hunter so learned and diligent as Porphyry should have missed at this time a collection which had been in circulation for at least seventy years. On the other hand, none of Porphyry's oracles is quoted as "Chaldaean" by later Neoplatonists, and Lewy's argument from doctrinal agreement falls short of proof.[17] On the whole it would seem prudent to continue to keep separate the three groups of oracles — theosophical, Porphyrian, Chaldaean — rather than fuse parts of the first two with the third. We have seen in the notorious case of Posidonius how much harm can be done by treating as a "fragment" every passage which shows similarity to an attested fragment, and then using these "new fragments" as evidence from which to build up an enlarged synthetic picture.

Lewy's long second chapter provides by far the most circum-

[15] I should except the anapaestic lines quoted by Eus., Prep. Ev. 5.8.10 (=Wolff, p. 159). Their content as well as their metre seems to exclude the possibility of attaching them to the Chald. Or.; for they are plainly a *κλῆσις* addressed by the magician to Apollo (and not *vice versa*, as Lewy tries to establish by juggling with the text, p. 59).

[16] Cf. The Greeks and the Irrational, 295 ff.

[17] Lewy relies especially on the rare use of the word *δοχεύς* for "medium" (in place of the commoner *κάτοχος*), which he regards as a mark of "Chaldaean" origin. But can we be sure that it is in fact "Chaldaean"? It occurs in two of Eusebius' Porphyrian oracles, and in a trochaic (and surely therefore, *pace* L., non-Chaldaean) oracle quoted by Proc., in Remp. I. 111.28, probably from Porphyry; but not, I think, in any attested *verbatim* fragment of the Chald. Or. It is true that Proclus and other late Neoplatonists use it with reference to theurgy, but it remains possible that, like Eusebius (Prep. Ev. 3.16), they learned the term from Porphyry.

stantial account of "Chaldaean" theology which has yet been produced. He has taken immense pains to dovetail together the smallest scraps of information that we possess, and to extract from them something which has at least the semblance of a coherent system. The task was no easy one: so vague and imprecise is the flowery verbiage in which the "system" is clothed that, as Nock once put it, "it is very hard to be sure of the meaning of anything in the *Oracles*." [18] Even after Lewy's work much remains doubtful. It is difficult to form a clear picture of the relationships between the various divine principles, of which the most important are the Father, the First or "Paternal" Intellect, the Second Intellect which contains the Platonic Forms and creates the physical world, and the Cosmic Soul which is somehow equated with Hecate. In addition, a place and function have to be found for Chronos (and/or Aion), for Eros, for three World Rulers (*κοσμαγοί* or *ἀρχικοὶ πατέρες*), for a "transmundane sun," for the planetary gods, and for entities called *συνοχεῖς*, *ἴυγγες*, etc. One cannot help suspecting that in the mind of the author or authors [19] the hypostases of the philosophers and the gods and daemons of Greco-oriental cult are very incompletely fused.

Chapter III deals with the descent and reascent of the human soul, and with the rite of *ἀναγωγή* or *ἀπαθανατισμός* which Lewy considers "the chief mystery of the Chaldaean sacramental community." Details of the procedure are unhappily missing: in order to give the reader some picture of it (pp. 208 ff.) Lewy is compelled to draw on descriptions of parallel (?) rituals in Apuleius, Heliodorus and the great Paris magical papyrus. He thinks, no doubt rightly, that the symbolic burial mentioned by Proclus (Theol. Plat., 193.38) formed part of it: it was a ritual pre-enactment of death (p. 205).[20] But I cannot agree with him when he goes on to connect the symbolic burial with the strange

[18] Gnomon, 12 (1936), 607, n. 3.

[19] Lewy thinks (p. 36) that the Oracles were not a continuous didactic poem but (as the title *Λόγια δι' ἐπῶν* would suggest) a collection of separate oracles given on different occasions. And internal contradictions are certainly easier to account for on this view.

[20] Not, however, a symbolic *suicide*: I can find no warrant in the text for Lewy's statement that "it is the initiate who at the bidding of the theurgists buries his own body."

assertion quoted by Psellus (Comm. in Or. Chald., 1141 B) "*βίῃ ⟨ὅτι⟩ σῶμα λιπόντων*" *ψυχαὶ καθαρώταται*. "Those who have left the body by violence" cannot be equated with the Chaldaean initiates; [21] they are surely the *βιαιοθάνατοι*, whom all ancient tradition represented as unquiet earthbound ghosts, and if so we must emend *καθαρώταται* to *κατάρατοι* (Kroll) or perhaps *ἀκάθαρτοι*.

Chapters IV and V are concerned respectively with "Chaldaean" magic and "Chaldaean" demonology. On magic Lewy is a little disappointing; this is not his main field of interest, and he has overlooked the helpful analogy with modern spiritualism, which employs the same techniques with comparable results.[22] But he is interesting and instructive on demonology, particularly on the conception of Hades (pp. 279 ff.), not as the Underworld or its king, but as the evil "lord of the terrestrial domain," corresponding to the Iranian Ahriman. He utilizes in this chapter (pp. 273 ff.) the demonology of de myst. 3. 31 (while admitting that not everything in that passage derives from the Oracles), and also the Aegyptius of Synesius. On the other hand, the much discussed demonology of Porph., de abst. 2. 37–43, which also posits a Prince of Darkness, is relegated to an appendix (Excursus XI), where from a comparison with Proclus, in Tim. I. 77.6 ff. Lewy argues that while its ultimate basis is Iranian its proximate source is the *Περὶ δαιμόνων* of the pagan Platonist Origenes.[23]

In the second part of his book Lewy investigates with great thoroughness and wide learning the origins of the whole strange amalgam, distinguishing "the Platonic elements" (chap. VI) from "the oriental elements" (chap. VII). The conclusion of chapter VI, that contemporary Platonism is "the single source of the entire philosophical information," seems to me to be sub-

[21] Cf. Olymp., in Phaed. 243.4, where "theurgic" death is distinguished from death by suicide or violence.

[22] Cf. The Greeks and the Irrational, 295 ff. Incidentally, I cannot accept Lewy's curious statement (pp. 253–254) that the soul of Plato became visible to the theurgist "as a geometrical luminous figure." The geometrical *χαρακτήρ* was an evocative symbol, not a constituent part of an apparition.

[23] Proclus, however, mentions two sources, Origenes and Numenius; and Lewy's grounds for excluding the latter (of whom Zeller, Cumont and others had thought) are hardly decisive.

stantially[24] correct. But second-century Platonism had many variant forms. Is it possible to be more precise? Lewy looks for parallels (pp. 324 ff.) to the four divine hypostases of the Oracles, — the Father, the two Intellects, and the World Soul — and finds them (a) in the unnamed philosophers mentioned by Arnobius, adv. nat. 2.25, (b) in the Gnostics criticized by Plotinus, Enn. 2.9.6. These do not take us much further; as regards (b), Lewy holds firmly that similarities between "Chaldaean" and Gnostic doctrine are indications, not of Gnostic influence as Kroll and Bidez thought, but of parallel and independent development from Platonic and Iranian premises (pp. 390 ff.). We can, however, add (c) Chalcidius,[25] pp. 233.8 ff., who seems to draw here, as so often elsewhere, upon Numenius. And we have Numenius' own word for it that he recognized two Divine Intellects.[26] Moreover, he announces his doctrine in a form which strikingly recalls the Oracles: while these say "The Father entrusted all things to a Second Intellect, which all ye race of men call the First" (Psellus, Comm. 1140), Numenius has "It is as if Plato said 'Ye men, that Intellect ye guess at is not the First; prior to it is another Intellect, older and more divine' " (fragm. 26). This can hardly be pure coincidence, and the hypothesis of a common source (Lewy, p. 320) does not help much unless we can identify it.

There are a number of other points of agreement — most of them unmentioned in Lewy's book — between the Oracles and Numenius.[27] In both systems the Supreme God, whom both call "the Father" and "the monad," is said to transcend all "works" (ἔργα, Oracles, p. 13 Kroll, Numenius, fragm. 21). In

[24] Provided the term "Platonism" is used in a wide enough sense to cover Numenius, whom antiquity on the whole preferred to call a Pythagorean. But Lewy is perhaps at times a trifle over-ingenious in identifying "Chaldaean" with Platonist doctrines. Thus I can see no close relationship between the fragment quoted p. 179, n. 8 (=Kroll, p. 26) and Plato, Tim. 41 d, or between the World Soul pictured as a girdle (ζωστήρ) and Tim. 36 e.

[25] Cf. Theiler, Chald. Or. u. Synesios, 7. On Chalcidius' use of Numenius see now J. C. M. van Winden, Calcidius on Matter (Leiden, 1959). Numenian influence on the present passage is strongly suggested by the description of the Second God as *latorem legis*: Numenius had called him ὁ νομοθέτης (fragm. 22).

[26] Numenius, fragm. 26 Leemans. His "First Intellect" is identical with the Supreme God, and this view seems to be implied in some fragments of the Oracles, whereas other fragments appear to distinguish them (Lewy, p. 322, cf. Kroll, p. 14).

[27] Cf. Festugière, Rév. d'Hermès, III. 53 ff., IV. 132 ff.

both, the Second Intellect is dyadic (δυάς, Oracles, p. 14 K., διττός, Numenius, fragm. 25), since it is directed at once to the Intelligibles and to Matter. In both, Matter is evil, and informed by an active evil principle (the Chaldaean "Hades," Numenius' evil world-soul, p. 94 Leemans). In both, the human mind must make itself empty (κενεόν, Oracles, p. 11 K., the ἐρημία of Numenius, fragm. 11) in order to receive God; otherwise, as both tell us, the vision will be illusory. Finally, the statement of the Oracles about the Father, πάντ' ἐστι γάρ, ἀλλὰ νοητῶς (p. 19 K.), is an application of Numenius' principle ἐν πᾶσιν πάντα εἶναι, οἰκείως μέντοι κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἐν ἑκάστοις (p. 97.26 Leemans). These agreements must seem too many and too specific to be accidental, especially when we remember that we are dealing with fragments on both sides. Some sort of bridge must have linked the two systems; but I find it hard to be quite sure which way the traffic ran.[28] It could even have been a two-way traffic, since so far as our scanty knowledge goes Numenius and Julianus may well have been contemporaries. In the last of the instances quoted above the oracle-maker would appear to be applying the philosopher's generalization; on the other hand, the address to mankind is much more natural in an oracle than in a philosophical dialogue.[29] Certainly a work like the Oracles would appeal to Numenius, who was, in Macrobius' words, *occultorum curiosior*,[30] just as it did to his fellow-Pythagorean Nicomachus of Gerasa, the earliest extant author to refer to theurgy.[31]

As to the oriental elements (chap. VII), Lewy concludes that the original theurgists (who were probably "Chaldaean" by race

[28] Cf. Les Sources de Plotin (Entretiens Hardt, Tome V), 10 f., 33 f.

[29] This is hardly disproved by [Plat.] Clitopho 407 a ὥσπερ ἐπὶ μηχανῆς τραγικῆς θεός, ὕμνεις λεγων· ποῖ φέρεσθε, ἄνθρωποι . . . , where the implication is that such apostrophes were felt to be alien to the dialogue style.

[30] Numenius, fragm. 39. His addiction to τελεστική (p. 100.19 Leemans), on which Julianus the theurgist was the great expert, is attested by fragms. 9 and 33.

[31] Nicomachus, Excerpta de musica, p. 277 Jan. Lewy thinks the reference an interpolation, since Nicomachus "lived in the first half of the second century" (p. 250, n. 83). But the earliest *terminus ante quem* for Nicomachus is given by the fact that Apuleius translated one of his books; and Apuleius (born about 123–125) may well have been active quite late in the century (the date of his death is unknown). There is thus no difficulty in making Nicomachus a contemporary of Julianus.

as well as by spiritual inheritance) drew on a pre-existing "Irano-Syro-Babylonian theocrasy" (p. 425). Thus the Aion (or rather Chronos) of the Oracles represents the Iranian Zervan (pp. 401 ff.); the Ἑπτάκτις θεός of the Oracles derives from Syrian solar theology (pp. 409 ff.); [32] the ἑπτάπορος βαθμίς recalls the Mithraic κλῖμαξ ἑπτάπυλος (p. 414); the ἀρχαί or κοσμαγοί are the ἄρχοντες or κοσμοκράτορες of Babylonian astral religion (p. 423). So far as I can judge, all these identifications appear plausible if not certain. And we can now add (as Nock points out, Speculum 34, 1959, 473 f.) the divine names "Ad" and "Adad" cited in the new portion of Proclus' commentary on the Parmenides (Plato Latinus III. 58–60). Adad appears to be the Syrian Hadad (Macrob., Sat. 1. 23.17), Ad an invented name; it seems safe to equate them respectively with the δὶς (Ad + Ad) ἐπέκεινα and the ἅπαξ ἐπέκεινα who figure elsewhere in the Oracles. It is a curious jumble; but as Lewy rightly points out, such syncretism was already in the air. Not only was there a coalescence between cults of diverse national origin, but Greek and oriental doctrine were drawing together. The sort of Platonists whom the theurgists read were already prepared to admit Iranian dualism (cf., e.g., Plut., Is. et Os. 46, 370 E), and to identify Plato's teaching about the soul's descent and return with its astral journey as described in the eastern cults (cf., Celsus apud Origen, c. Cels. 6.21 f.). Hence it was easy for theurgy to win acceptance as "the last form of pagan religion" (p. 441).

Appended to the book are a series of excursuses. Some of these provide most useful factual surveys: e.g., on Neoplatonic modes of reference to the Oracles (Exc. I); on neologisms and rare words in the Oracles (Exc. III); on the meaning and history of the term "theurgy" (Exc. IV). Others are concerned with particular source-problems. Especially valuable is Exc. VI, where Lewy collects the widely scattered references to the Oracles in the works of Psellus, and shows, against Bidez, that Pletho got his knowledge of them solely from Psellus.[33]

To sum up, despite its faults — not all of which should be

[32] Kroll's idea, that what lies behind the Oracles is the Zoroastrian fire-cult, is rejected by Lewy (p. 429, n. 104), I think rightly.

[33] To whom we also, it now appears, owe the preservation of the de mysteriis (see M. Sicherl in Byz. Ztschr., 53, 1960).

laid at the author's door — Lewy's book makes a solid and indispensable contribution to our understanding of this latest phase of paganism. If we are to advance any further, what is now most needed is a comprehensive collection not only of *verbatim* fragments but of all references to the doctrines and practices of theurgy. It is a matter of deep regret that Lewy did not live to carry this out himself; but he has done a great deal to prepare the ground for any future editor.[34]

[34] On the textual side, intending editors should note his elegant and certain correction of the hopeless-looking line *ἔννοιαι πατρὸς αἰδεύμεθα σε μον εἰλυμένον πῦρ* to *ἔννοιαι πατρὸς αἴδε, μεθ' ἃς ἐμὸν εἰλυμένον πῦρ* (p. 91, n. 97), and his *ἄγκτηραι* (or rather *ἄγκτειραι*?) for *ἄκτειραι* at p. 298, n. 151. Several times, on the other hand, he prints (or his editors print) what seems metrically impossible even for gods, e.g., at p. 83, n. 62, p. 86, n. 74 (read *θεοῦ*), p. 191, n. 55 (read perhaps *καὶ κάλλη ἄφραστα καλεῖται*?).

THEODORE PARKER: APOSTASY WITHIN LIBERALISM *

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I am not the first to detect in recent scholarship dealing with the "Transcendental" period of New England a tendency toward vindicating, or at least toward putting in a good word for, the hitherto regularly berated opponents of Emerson and Theodore Parker. Because in the 1830's and 1840's and well into the 1850's the phalanx of those most outspoken in resistance were the Unitarian clergy, the custom has been for chroniclers of the literary and theological radicalism to heap derision upon the men who occupied established pulpits in the neighborhood of Boston and who spoke for the substantial portions of the community. In this indictment it is *de rigueur* to relate that after Parker's South Boston sermon of May 19, 1841, entitled The Transient and Permanent in Christianity, only eight of the local ministers would any longer "exchange" pulpits with him. Furthermore, after the publication in January, 1842, of A Discourse of Matters Pertaining to Religion, the Boston Association directly challenged Parker to withdraw of his own accord. In the annals of American Protestant "liberality" these actions have long figured, axiomatically, as "persecution." Only within the last decade have voices been hesitantly raised to suggest that possibly something may be said on behalf of the alleged persecutors. Could it be that Unitarian Boston was not quite so bigoted as it has been represented?

Anyone brought up in the hitherto prevailing tradition, that which was established by Parker's biographers in the later half of the century — by John Weiss, O. B. Frothingham, John White Chadwick — would assume as a matter of course that in the contests of the 1830's and '40's Emerson was the purest of white and Andrews Norton as black as the pit, that Parker was a gleaming

* The above lecture was read at the Harvard Divinity School on November 17, 1960.

Galahad while the Boston Association, with its eight memorable exceptions, was a nest of vipers. Interestingly enough, gestures toward a revision of this account have come from younger scholars. Possibly this phenomenon is a symptom of that swing toward "conformity" which elders with treasured memories of their own youthful deviations are prone to deplore. If to many fresh eyes Emerson and Parker are beginning to appear as too fantastically obstreperous, as they did seem when judged by the organizational standards of a Samuel K. Lothrop or an Andrew Peabody, then we may no longer hold the comfortable persuasion that the Unitarianism of that time, which proclaimed itself "liberal," was entirely hypocritical.

What a revolution in our historiography is adumbrated, let alone enacted, by the very raising of this consideration! As early as 1848 James Russell Lowell posed, in A Fable for Critics, what had already become the ultra-liberal query which no Unitarian might evade: how could the liberal Christianity conceivably accuse *anybody* of heresy, let alone a man of Parker's manifest sincerity? It should, of course, dissociate itself from professed atheists and Deists, but how could there be within the community which owed allegiance to William Ellery Channing anything short of them which deserved to be treated as apostasy? These "Socinians," as Lowell mischievously called them, said they believed something, though he confessed himself baffled as to just what it might be:

> I think I may call
> Their belief a believing in nothing at all,
> Or something of that sort; I know they all went
> For a general union of total dissent:
> He went a step farther; without cough or hem,
> He frankly avowed he believed not in them;
> And, before he could be jumbled up or prevented,
> From their orthodox kind of dissent he dissented.

So the refrain continued, even into 1926, with Vernon Parrington's Main Currents: Parker spoke out the truth which he had gathered at immense pains, said Parrington, and so was decried as a demagogue and agitator by "ministers and lawyers and merchants and politicians, men in high position, distinguished leaders

of Boston society." Parker offended, according to Parrington, the Boston code of good breeding; he "pronounced judgment on Bostonians respected in the Back Bay, mighty in State Street." In 1936 the latest of Parker's biographers, Henry Commager, concluded with the familiar recitation that Parker had the courage as a young man, unknown and friendless, "to meet those black looks, those biting remarks, at the Berry Street Conferences." Parker had the great fortitude to endure the social ostracism, the odium. "Perhaps," mused Commager, "it would have been better if he had not fought back so hard; but he was a fighter, he couldn't help that." From Lowell to Commager, the scoundrels of the piece are the guardians of propriety, and these not the Orthodox, not the Calvinists or the Methodists, but the liberal clergy, who, according to the sanctified narrative, turned upon him in a petulant rage which has exposed for all time, even until today, the hollowness of their pretensions to liberality. Instead of proving to be men of authentic probity, they showed themselves close hypocrites. Behind the courteous mask are disclosed the leprous features of what Parker thunderously denounced as "Hunkerism."

By the perfervid eloquence with which Parker presents himself as the martyr — in his public utterances, in his letters and journals — he contrives that any account of him must inescapably exhibit a saint crucified on Boston Common. His appeal overcomes the charges of his critics and even the frequent admissions of his followers that he obviously relished the rôle, that he embraced and exaggerated the contumely of his brethren. What free spirit among us can help but be stirred into adherence by such a passage as this — announced to his "congregation" of three thousand, all refugees from conventional churches, in the Music Hall on November 14, 1852?

> With such views, you see in what esteem I must be held by society, church, and state. I cannot be otherwise than hated. This is the necessity of my position — that I must be hated.

"Call me Ishmael," commenced the author of the most gigantic of American nonconformities, a romance entitled Moby-Dick, published a year before Parker's "Some Account of My Minis-

try." For our century, which prides itself on having re-discovered Melville, on having for the first time divined the spiritual drive within Melville's diabolism, Parker becomes, even more dramatically than Frothingham or Chadwick could imagine, an archangel of dissent. For us, striving to breathe an atmosphere already filled with the filings of steel and threatened to be permeated with particles of hydrogen, salvation is sought through vicarious identification with the figure of the rebel, the outsider, the angry young man — the more so while we are supinely submitting to the televised Hunkerism of the singing commercial. Hence Parker still looms for us, along with John Brown and Henry Thoreau, as one of the majestic nay-sayers in pre-Civil War America. So, if there are now murmurs against the canonization which liberals long ago bestowed upon him, we are indeed upon the threshold of a new crisis — if we have not already stumbled into it — similar to the agonizing one in which he was a principal actor — and victim.

Undoubtedly we today have to ask whether his habit of sentimentalizing his ostracism was not a form of self-pity. In his own time his friends would grant that he did a bit luxuriate in martyrdom, but they could then rally round what they held were his revolutionary teachings, and so maintain the standard attitude of militant defiance. For us, almost all his once earth-shaking pronouncements are commonplaces, have become in fact platitudes. Hence most of us are left sadly unmoved — where his friends were moved to tears of rage — by the disclosure of this passage from his journal on the eve of his forty-second birthday:

> Poor dear father, poor dear mother! You little knew how many a man would curse the son you painfully brought into life, and painfully and religiously brought up. Well, I will bless you — true father and most holy mother were you to me: the earliest thing you taught me was *duty* — duty to God, duty to man; that life is not a pleasure, not a pain, but a *duty*.

Though we can hardly doubt the sincerity of this passage we are almost bound, I am sure, to detect in it an embarrassing mawkishness, a somewhat affected posturing before the mirror. And even many of the utterances to which his admirers have

vibrated for a century may well appear to us slightly tinged with the sour envy of the plebeian for the patrician.

> I will go eastward and westward, and northward and southward, and make the land *ring*; and if this New England theology, that cramps the intellect and palsies the soul of us, does not come to the ground, then it shall be because it has more truth in it than I have ever found.

The reiterations of biographers and other celebrants — the facility with which they fall into the same incantations of denunciation for the respectable — eventually excite a suspicion among us that Parker seduces us into allegiance precisely because the targets of his most telling abuse are Boston and Harvard College. Satirizing the rigidities and sterilities of these communities has for many years become a sure-fire way of making a hit in Dubuque. They are always good for a laugh, as, to mention only two out of many recent examples, the commercial successes of John Marquand's The Late George Apley and Cleveland Amory's The Proper Bostonians demonstrate. The characters in such works who are shown in a comic light are almost always Unitarians — or if not, then former Unitarians who have sought a still more placid peace of mind by becoming Episcopalians. They are stereotypes cut from the same cardboard Santayana used for The Last Puritan. Therefore persons who are not Bostonians are happy to applaud when they find Parker writing in 1845: "I went to the meeting of the Unitarian Association; a stupid meeting it was, too. The brethren looked on me as the *Beni Elohim* looked on Satan, as he came last of all. However, they shook hands all the more tenderly, because the heart was not in it, and then turned the cold shoulder." However, this sort of thing is so infectious that Bostonians themselves join in the fun and discover a perverse pride in relishing all ridicule of themselves. The Harvard Divinity School has so hugged to its bosom the jibes Parker levied against it that I should do a work of supererogation were I now to repeat the old chestnuts. Once Parker was safely dead and could no longer make a nuisance of himself, the most proper of Bostonians would graciously accept as the highest of compliments Parker's remark

to his fellow agitator, Charles Sumner (whom the same classes also execrated in his life but whom they honored after his death by erecting his statue in Harvard Square), "Boston is a queer little city, the public is a desperate tyrant there, and it is seldom that one dares disobey the commands of public opinion."

Furthermore, as an encouragement to revisionist thinking, it manifestly is fair to admit that any fraternity has a constitutional right to refuse to accept persons it dislikes. The Unitarian clergy were an exclusive club of cultivated gentlemen — as the term was then understood in the Back Bay — and Parker was definitely not a gentleman, either in theology or in manners. Ezra Stiles Gannett, an honorable representative of the sanhedrin, addressed himself frankly to the issue in 1845, insisting that Parker should not be persecuted or calumniated and that in this republic no power to restrain him by force could exist. Even so, Gannett judiciously argued, the Association could legitimately decide that Parker "should not be encouraged nor assisted in diffusing his opinions by those who differ from him in regard to their correctness." We today are not entitled to excoriate honest men who believed Parker to be downright pernicious and who barred their pulpits against his demand to poison the minds of their congregations. One can even argue — though this is a delicate matter — that every justification existed for their returning the Public Lecture to the First Church, and so to suppress it, rather than let Parker use it as a sounding board for his propaganda when his turn should come to occupy it. Finally, it did seem clear as day to these clergymen, as Gannett's son explained in the biography of his father, they had always contended for the propriety of their claim to the title of Christians. Their demand against the Calvinist Orthodoxy for intellectual liberty had never meant that they would follow "free inquiry" to the extreme of proclaiming Christianity a "natural" religion.

Grant all this — still, when modern Unitarianism and the Harvard Divinity School recall with humorous affection the insults Parker lavished upon them, or else argue that after all Parker received the treatment he invited, they betray an uneasy conscience. Whenever New England liberalism is reminded of the dramatic confrontation of Parker and the fraternity on Janu-

ary 23, 1843 — while it may defend the privilege of Chandler Robbins to demand that Parker leave the Association, while it may plead that Dr. N. L. Frothingham had every warrant for stating, "The difference between Trinitarians and Unitarians is a difference in Christianity; the difference between Mr. Parker and the Association is a difference between no Christianity and Christianity" — despite these supposed conclusive assurances, the modern liberal heaves repeatedly a sigh of relief, of positive thanksgiving, that the Association never quite brought itself officially to expel Parker. Had it done so, the blot on its escutcheon would have remained indelible, nor could the Harvard Divinity School assemble today to honor Parker's insurgence other than by getting down on its collective knees and crying "peccavi."

Happily for posterity, then, the Boston Association did not actually command Parker to leave the room, though it came too close for comfort to what would have been an unforgivable brutality. Fortunately, the honor of the denomination can attest that Cyrus Bartol defended Parker's sincerity, as did also Gannett and Chandler Robbins; whereupon Parker broke down into convulsions of weeping and rushed out of the room, though not out of the Fellowship. In the hall, after adjournment, Dr. Frothingham took him warmly by the hand and requested Parker to visit him — whereupon our burly Theodore again burst into tears.

All this near tragedy, which to us borders on comedy, enables us to tell the story over and over again, always warming ourselves with a glow of complacency. It was indeed a near thing, but somehow the inherent decency of New England (which we inherit) did triumph. Parker was never excommunicated. To the extent that he was ostracized or even reviled, we solace ourselves by saying he asked for it. Yet, even after all these stratagems, the conscience of Christian liberality is still not laid to rest, any more than is the conscience of Harvard University for having done the abject penance for its rejection of Ralph Waldo Emerson's The Divinity School Address of naming its hall of philosophy after him. In both cases the stubborn fact remains: liberalism gave birth to two brilliant apostates, both legitimate offspring of its loins, and when brought to the test, it behaved

shabbily. Suppose they both had ventured into realms which their colleagues thought infidel: is this the way gentlemen settle frank differences of opinion? Is it after all possible that no matter how the liberals trumpet their confidence in human dignity they are exposed to a contagion of fear more insidious than any conservative has ever to worry about?

However, there is a crucial difference between the two histories. Emerson evaded the problem by shoving it aside, or rather by leaving it behind him: he walked out of the Unitarian communion, so that it could lick the wound of his departure, preserve its self-respect and eventually accord him pious veneration. Parker insisted upon *not* resigning, even when the majority wanted him to depart, upon daring the Fellowship to throw him out. Hence he was in his lifetime, as is the memory of him afterwards, a canker within the liberal sensitivity. He still points an accusing finger at all of us, telling us we have neither the courage to support him nor the energy to cut his throat.

Actually, the dispute between Parker and the society of his time, both ecclesiastical and social, was a real one, a bitter one. It cannot be smoothed over by now cherishing his sarcasms as delightful bits of self-deprecation or by solemnly calling for a reconsideration of the justice of the objections to him. The fact is incontestable: that liberal world of Unitarian Boston *was* narrow-minded, intellectually sterile, smug, afraid of the logical consequences of its own mild ventures into iconoclasm, and quite prepared to resort to hysterical repressions when its brittle foundations were threatened. Parker, along with Garrison and Charles Sumner, showed a magnificent moral bravery when facing mobs mobilized in defense of the Mexican War and slavery. Nevertheless, we can find reasons for respecting even the bigotry of the populace; their passions were genuine, and the division between them and the abolitionists is clear-cut. But Parker as the ultra-liberal minister within the pale of a church which had proclaimed itself the repository of liberality poses a different problem, which is not to be resolved by holding him up as the champion of freedom. Even though his theological theses have become, to us, commonplaces, the fundamental interrogation he phrased is very much with us. It has been endlessly rephrased,

but I may here put it thus: at what point do the tolerant find themselves obliged to become intolerant? And then, as they become aware that they have reached the end of their patience, what do they, to their dismay, learn for the first time about themselves?

There can be no doubt, the Boston of that era could be exquisitely cruel in enforcing its canons of behavior. The gentle Channing, revered by all Bostonians, orthodox or Unitarian, wrote to a friend in Louisville that among its many virtues Boston did not abound in a tolerant spirit, that the yoke of opinion crushed individuality of judgment and action:

> No city in the world is governed so little by a police, and so much by mutual inspections and what is called public sentiment. We stand more in awe of one another than most people. Opinion is less individual or runs more into masses, and often rules with a rod of iron.

Even more poignantly, and with the insight of a genius, Channing added — remember, this is Channing, not Parker! — that should a minister in Boston trust himself to his heart, should he "speak without book, and consequently break some law of speech, or be hurried into some daring hyperbole, he should find little mercy."

Channing wrote this — in a letter! I think it fair to say that he never quite reached such candor in his sermons. But Theodore Parker, commencing his mission to the world-at-large, disguised as the minister of a "twenty-eighth Congregational Church" which bore no resemblance to the Congregational polities descended from the founders (among which were still the Unitarian churches), made explicit from the beginning that the conflict between him and the Hunkerish society was not something which could be evaporated into a genteel difference about clerical decorum. Because he spoke openly with what Channing had prophesied someone might — with daring hyperbole — Parker vindicated Channing's further prophecy that he who committed this infraction of taste would promptly discover how little mercy liberals were disposed to allow to libertarians who appeared to them libertines. An institutionalized liberalism proved

itself fundamentally an institution, and only within those defined limits a license.

By reminding ourselves of these factors in the situation, we should, I am sure, come to a fresh realization, however painful it be, that the battle between Parker and his neighbors was fought in earnest. He arraigned the citizens in language of so little courtesy that they had to respond with, at the least, resentment. What otherwise could "the lawyer, doctor, minister, the men of science and letters" do when told that they had "become the cherubim and seraphim and the three archangels who stood before the golden throne of the merchant, and continually cried, 'Holy, holy, holy is the Almighty Dollar' "? Nor, when we recollect how sensitive were the emotions of the old Puritan stock in regard to the recent tides of immigration, should we be astonished that their thin lips were compressed into a white line of rage as Parker snarled at them thus:

> Talk about the Catholics voting as the bishop tells! reproach the Catholics for it! You and I do the same thing. There are a great many bishops who have never had a cross on their bosom, nor a mitre on their head, who appeal not to the authority of the Pope at Rome, but to the Almighty Dollar, a pope much nearer home. Boston has been controlled by a few capitalists, lawyers and other managers, who told the editors what to say and the preachers what to think.

This was war. Parker meant business. And he took repeated care to let his colleagues know that he intended them: "Even the Unitarian churches have caught the malaria, and are worse than those who deceived them" — which implied that they were very bad indeed. It was "*Duty*" he said that his parents had given him as a rule — beyond even the love that suffused his being and the sense of humor with which he was largely supplied — and it was duty he would perform, though it cost him acute pain and exhausted him by the age of fifty. Parker could weep — and he wept astonishingly often and on the slightest provocation — but the psychology of those tears was entirely compatible with a remorseless readiness to massacre his opponents. "If it gave me pleasure to say hard things," he wrote, "I would shut up for ever." We have to tell ourselves that when Parker spoke in this

vein, he believed what he said, because he could continue, "But the TRUTH, which cost me bitter tears to say, I must speak, though it cost other tears hotter than fire." Because he copiously shed his own tears, and yielded himself up as a living sacrifice to the impersonalized conscience of New England, he was not disturbed by the havoc he worked in other people's consciences.

Our endeavor to capture even a faint sense of how strenuous was the fight is muffled by our indifference to the very issue which in the Boston of 1848 seemed to be the central hope of its Christian survival, that of the literal, factual historicity of the miracles as reported in the Four Gospels. It is idle to ask why we are no longer disturbed if somebody, professing the deepest piety, decides anew that it is of no importance whether or not Christ transformed the water into wine at eleven A. M. on the third of August, A. D. 32. We have no answer as to why we are not alarmed. So we are the more prepared to give Parker the credit for having taken the right side in an unnecessary controversy, to salute his courage, and to pass on, happily forgetting both him and the entire episode. We have not the leisure, or the patience, or the skill, to comprehend what was working in the mind and heart of a then recent graduate from the Harvard Divinity School who would muster the audacity to contradict his most formidable instructor, the majesterial Andrews Norton, by saying that, while he believed Jesus "like other religious teachers," worked miracles, "I see not how a miracle proves a doctrine." What indeed *has* happened to us? While we sagely approve this devastation of Parker's, we ourselves are not prepared to make of it a slogan against the miracles. It is worth an hour of our time to summon up the shade of Theodore Parker, if only to let him squarely put the question to us.

For clearly it is not enough to answer that we have exhausted the subject or that it has exhausted us, that we consider it wearisome and no longer worth disputing. That is an easy way out, which enables us to leave our churches on a Sunday morning and go placidly home to an unperturbed dinner. It precludes our having to participate in the ferocity with which Parker propounded, and with which his enemies condemned, the jolting thesis of the South Boston sermon:

> If Jesus had taught at Athens, and not at Jerusalem; if he had wrought no miracles, and none but the human nature had ever been ascribed to him; if the Old Testament had forever perished at his birth — Christianity would still have been the word of God; it would have lost none of its truths.

Either this passage is arrant nonsense or else it says that something more incendiary is at work than an academic discourse about the authenticity of the miracles. If the first, then we have gathered today for a ceremonial exhumation, after which we shall seal the coffin for at least another century. If the second, then we are obliged to probe further into hidden chambers and ask what actually was at stake when Parker offended his colleagues over the miracles.

All accounts attest the staggering range of his reading. He was literate in at least twenty languages, he collected an immense library, and he pored over the interminable literature of early nineteenth-century German examinations of the Biblical texts — a jungle which was and which still is impenetrable for most students of theology. Yet in his own publications, and even more in his preaching, he made strikingly little use of this fund of learning. Indeed, the one and only monument to his titanic labors in his library is his version of the treatise on the Old Testament by Wilhelm Martin Leberecht De Wette. Born in 1780 in a town near Weimar, De Wette had known Schiller and Goethe, received his inspiration immediately from Herder. Exiled from Prussia by royal decree in 1819, he was for three decades the entrenched and powerful theologian at Basel, whence he fought against the rationalists on his left and the evangelical pietists on his right. Americans understood little of the European situation, and were instinctively hostile to everything German. They had no awareness of De Wette's position, but they had heard vaguely that he was dangerous to every form of Christianity. Parker entitled his rendition, A Critical and Historical Introduction to the Canonical Scriptures of the Old Testament. He completed the first draft in 1837, worked it over and over, added copious notes and comments, and finally put the huge manuscript through the press in July, 1843. Apparently it had no effect upon religious thought in America, except to advertise Parker's adher-

ence to Germanism and to insinuate by his use of "Canonical" in the title that he was attempting to shatter the coherence of the Old Testament.

In addition to the translating and the footnotes, Parker also spoke briefly but effectively for himself. If we seek the true grounds for his intransigence, we shall find it in this book rather than in his more diffuse and scandalous declarations about the miracles. Or rather, the latter statements were consequences of what he had learned from his study of De Wette: they were the corollary of his scholarship, though he was sufficiently a child of the New England tradition to know instinctively that in the pulpit the use of art is to conceal art. Verbal though he was — indeed much too profuse — and garrulous as were his publications, he never allowed himself the time to explain precisely wherein his technique consisted in a use of history to destroy historicity. Hence it may be said that he was something of an enigma to his contemporaries, and was even a puzzle to himself. In which case, we must expound more exactly than he ever quite could do, or cared to do, why he is worth remembering a hundred years after he expired in Florence.

Whereupon we have to attest that despite his omnivorous reading in the Biblical scholars he himself showed little or no originality in the technical areas. That which Emerson said of the whole Transcendental group applies even to him: their scholarship exhibited the typically American superficiality. But the square-toed son of a Lexington farmer, and the forthright grandson of the commander of militia on the Lexington Common, could make out, from his service with De Wette, that the education purveyed by the Harvard Divinity School evaded what De Wette termed "negative criticism." The School was always saying — the more nervously because the Orthodox accused it of merely negating — that such and such was true. Wherefore it had come, through no other compulsion than its own neurasthenia, to insisting that a man could not be accounted a Christian who disbelieved in the historicity of the miracles, though he might bask in the rays of salvation while serenely rejecting the Trinity. Parker hardly needed De Wette or any Continental scholar to point out the obvious discrepancy, though his Germanic impor-

tations supplied him with the authority to denounce it: the bias, not to say the shameless predilection, of his Unitarian elders in favor of the miracles and against the Trinity put blinders on their eyes. They could not freely employ any critical method. If they could not, then wherein were they actually more emancipated than the Calvinists? As Parker strove over and over again to make his point to the Association, he was not worried whether they did or did not believe in miracles. What galled him was that they should dogmatize in advance as to the factualness of the performances, and then smear as an Ishmael any who insisted, as Parker kept insisting, upon the preliminary need for an open-minded examination of the credentials. His apostasy within liberalism centers upon his elevation of this word "criticism," which his Unitarian opponents came to detest as the most insulting of the epithets he flung about him. This was the more disturbing because they were persuaded that they had practiced all the critical rigor the civilized world any longer required.

Parker strove to demonstrate to the glib American student wherein real erudition consisted by giving translations as well as the originals of Latin, Greek and Hebrew quotations. To pile Pelion upon Ossa, or perhaps we should say in order to add insult to injury, he added out of his own reading heaps of corroborative materials from patristic and modern commentators. The result was that he produced a De Wette which was nothing like what the *Einleitung* dared to be in its native language. Parker's rendition is a chronicle of how variously the Old Testament has been read by successive ages of Christendom, of how frequently the sense of one century has contradicted that of another. Thus he endeavored to teach the present generation to distrust its own dogmatics. He was, he tells us, tempted to entitle the book an Introduction on the Basis of De Wette rather than a Translation, but he decided the latter more "modest." Yet by publishing this quandary, Parker effectively violated his own modesty, and we may well conclude that in this case arrogance was the better part of valor. Still, he made his critics aware that the two volumes were something more than a literal rephrasing, that they were specifically directed at the vitals of liberality. "I can only hope," he concluded, "the work will

direct critical inquiries to a faithful examination of the Bible and that correct views of its origin and contents may at length prevail." This was an oblique way of announcing that so far only incorrect views were in circulation, at the Harvard Divinity School as well as at Andover. Parker's humble profession of hoping to be instrumental "in spreading the light of truth on this subject" could appear to his peers only as a conceited claim that he had a monopoly on that illumination.

He managed to highlight De Wette's basic statement of the method, of its scientific character, as being (the italics are Parker's) *historico-critical.* That is to say, as De Wette contended and as Parker gleefully translated, the Bible is to be considered a wholly historical phenomenon, completely subject to the professional rules of historical inquiry. Consequently, any consideration of it "in a religious view" comes into the range of De Wette's analysis only insofar as the dogma of inspiration and revelation is connected with the origin of the texts. It follows, De Wette put into the crucial sentence, "This dogma itself, therefore, is likewise to be treated historically." What Parker manufactured out of his "translation" thereupon appears in a paragraph of his own composition, which is not so much an addition as a blunt interpolation, which he distinguished from the original by printing it in brackets, and thereby loudly calling attention to it.

"Most of the English and American theologians," he wrote with deceptive calmness, insist that the books of the Bible, especially those of the Old Testament, be considered from a religious point of view, "declaring [again, the italics are Parker's] *dogmatic theology* is the touchstone, wherewith we are to decide between the true and false, the genuine and the spurious." Hence they refuse to examine — or are incapable of examining — the Bible as an historical production. They force themselves to treat it as the highest standard of human faith and life.

Parker does not go out of his way to note that this condemnation applies as well to Andrews Norton's ponderous and stillborn volumes on the Evidences of Christianity as to the Calvinistic commentaries of Moses Stuart. But in 1843 everybody in Eastern Massachusetts — and at Yale and Princeton — would

know whom he attacked. When either of them, Unitarian or Orthodox, approached the books of the Bible as a peculiar phenomenon, not to be judged by the same canons of criticism which apply to all other human writings — say, to the plays of Shakespeare — Parker roundly declared that their supposedly different methods remained in effect a single and erroneously stupid way of exposition — that which "strikes a death-blow to all criticism, and commits the Bible to a blind and indiscriminating belief."

The essences of Parker's thinking is here succinctly stated. We may say that throughout the last two hectic decades he did nothing but ring changes upon it, or merely repeat it. Some may then object that if this is all the shooting was about, then the provocation was trivial, that the whole commotion had better be forgotten rather than celebrated a century after Parker's self-imposed immolation.

I suspect that the issue is not dead. It is not only still with us, but in the era of Niebuhr and Tillich and Barth, it has actually become, if anything, more pressing than it was in the 1840's. At any rate, of this we may be assured, that Parker, guided by De Wette and his readings in German romantic literature, faced up to the problem of criticism as no one in his America did — as Emerson certainly never did and as in fact, strange though the conjunction at first sight appears, only Edgar Allan Poe came near to doing. Yet on second thought the conjunction is not too far-fetched. In the sense in which I use this phrase, "the problem of criticism," and as Parker was trying to spell it out both in the De Wette Introduction and in the Discourse, it pertains equally to the fields of literary evaluation and Biblical scholarship.

In the Discourse, amid what was as usual his too gushing volubility, Parker managed (as occasionally he could) to frame several compact sentences which his opponents never understood and the full implications of which, in all areas of the mind, Parker himself may not have appreciated. For Parker was thinking only of the parochial issue of the miracles when he said that because of a literal belief in the narrative of the Bible, "A deference is paid to it wholly independent of its intrinsic merit."

He had in mind mostly, maybe only, the then excitingly new discovery by the Romantic Age that history treated imaginatively need not be fettered by the history of historians when he declared that the mythology of the Bible should be surgically separated from its factual record, so that the critic could "take the Bible for what it is worth." This did not mean that he would reverence the factual and discard the mythological; on the contrary, knowledge of the distinction would make the latter meaningful for the first time in the life of Christianity. So he was speaking only as a Unitarian when he wrote that if we are required to "believe" the whole of the Bible, absurdities and all — if we stupidly make one part authoritative in the single sense by which we treat another as regulatory — "then we make the Bible our master, who puts Common Sense and Reason to silence, and drives Conscience and the religious Element out of the Church."

But suppose, if this be not too extravagant an interjection, we now substitute in Parker's sentences Hamlet for the Bible, and the cult of Shakespeare for the Unitarian Church. What have we, in either form, but a statement of the ever tormenting question of an individual's relation toward that to which he subjects himself — to that which is over and above him, more powerful that he can ever be, which he deeply loves but also in startling moments of awareness fears — against which he must preserve his own particular being? Parker's effort was to save the human spirit from becoming embalmed in Bibliolatry, just as a major effort of modern criticism has been to rescue living intelligence from Shakespeareolatry. The same obstacles persist: in Parker's day, his opponents did not know their souls had already atrophied amid their gracious conventions, as in our day academic instructors in Shakespeare courses are unaware their lungs have ceased to function. In that sense, Parker's campaign, at the Melodeon and at the Music Hall, was a contest for life against death, in which he used a timeless sense of historical fluctuations as his supreme weapon against the deadly illusion of historical finality.

Yet this is not to conclude — not by any means — that upon our re-examination we should join with Parrington and Commager in elevating Parker once more as the paladin of freedom against

repressive Boston. Some of his critics were intelligent enough not to denounce him solely because he divorced belief in Christ from belief in the miracles. A few were astute enough — let this be chalked up to their credit — to note that he was himself guilty of the very crime he charged against them. He delighted, for instance, in disclosing how he, and he alone, had found in the Pentateuch "marks of a distinct plan and design on the part of the compiler." He deciphered the cunning plot, this subtle scheme, as though he were a cryptographer breaking a code — as though he were Edgar Poe constructing and then unraveling a detective story — and so could describe the tremendous fabrication as "artificial." Then, speaking as a modern man of letters, he announced that this was no disparagement of the compiler any more than a similar criticism would be of the legendary compiler known as Homer. Both had constructed a national epic. What Parker would blame was the ridiculous fancy among Christians of thrusting the authorship of the Biblical romance onto the Deity.

Yet Parker was unwilling to note — even though he assured his people that he and they entertained many opinions which future criticism would prove erroneous — that this sort of "historical" method, especially when it exposed some secret design behind an obfuscation of Scripture, was as fully prepared to impose its scheme of interpretation upon the Bible as were Unitarians to impose upon it their fable of the miracles. Parker was ready, in the end of all, to translate the untranslatable into the dreary prose of De Wette, just as any Calvinist had formerly been eager to translate the Gospels into the five points of the Synod of Dort. Therefore it is not to be wondered at, that there should arise in modern theology, as in modern literary discussion, a tribe of recalcitrants who consign all of Parker's and De Wette's annotations, along with those of Strauss or Baur or Moulton, to the realm of irrelevant footnotes — who proclaim anew the inner coherence of the Bible, just as cognate spirits in the other sorts of criticism summon us to contemplate the "essential" tragedy of Hamlet apart from all historical consideration of Elizabethan manners, diction, or of the belief in the objective reality of ghosts. In a sense, Parker's opponents, standing firm on a prin-

ciple of interpretation which they would not yield to the formless relativity of historical anthropology, clinging fanatically to the sterile doctrine of the miracles, could rationally insist that they were the ones who came to the Bible for what it was worth, the ones who respected its intrinsic merit. Whereas Parker, pretending to separate wheat from chaff, merely extracted verses which suited his preconception, and then called the rest chaff. The Unitarians were saying, as Norton's Evidences boldly contended, that the divine revelation could not be made less divine by any amount of explication of the historical circumstances, by any account of tribal customs, or by any demonstrations of how books were compiled or texts interlaced. Employ the *historico-critical* method as rigorously as you will, this generation of Unitarians in effect (though seldom as pungently as they should have) declared, the Bible remains the Bible. And the Bible, though it does not mention the Trinity and so should not bear the burden of this monstrosity, emphatically does tell of the miracles, exactly as Hamlet does contain a ghost. Parker, in their view, was deceiving not only the multitudes who flocked to the Music Hall instead of to decently constituted churches, but also himself. The glad tidings he gave out were not those of release, after all, but of an enslavement to *a priori* Transcendentalism.

Meanwhile, out of his study of the Old Testament under De Wette's tuition, Parker acquired a deep respect for the prophets, even while he was learning an even deeper contempt for the priests. As he taught himself and his people to discard the notion that the prophets had ever pretended to be forecasters of events he saw with what seemed to him absolute clarity that they had been men who grasped the nature of their social emergencies, who realized wherein lay the sinful complacency of the prosperous. As soon as he conceived the "truth" of the Old Testament in these terms he understood why priests who offered their congregations an explanation of the Bible which purported to be definitive for all time to come would by that very token not be disturbed by slavery, by the flourishing of prostitution in Boston, or by the cheats and hypocrisies of ordinary business conduct. They could not be prophets, for their

theology rendered them insensitive to the crises of their time. We may suppose that merely by temperament Parker would have flung himself into all such "causes" as abolition and women's rights, but his doctrine of the prophet as opposed to the priest certainly supplied him with a formal justification. Only a prophet could denounce the rituals of the priests in the name of a Jehovah who was the eternal rule of virtue. The paradox with which the prophets could live but which terrified the sanctimonious priests consisted in the recognition that this standard of righteousness was to be apprehended only through familiarity with the historical, and so with the temporal and fleeting, manifestations of it. History thus elevated its own methodology into a destructive force, which over and over again became the purgation of false religion. Yet destruction was not an end in itself: it was the necessary prologue, age after age, to what Parker, in his most ecstatic moments, hailed as "absolute religion."

It is a distorted image of Parker that the ancient and honorable of Massachusetts held of him during his life, which they cherished after his death, that of the religious demagogue, the brash seeker for publicity by sensationally taking up every disreputable movement for "reform" then being agitated among New England's peculiarly active lunatic fringe. This judgment casts discredit upon the judges, not upon Parker, for it is blind to the majestic nobility of the man. It is, however, an equally distorted portrait that has been created by such libertarians as Parrington, by the epigoni of Transcendentalism in the various "free religion" movements, by cantankerous village nonconformists — that of the ever stalwart fighter for freedom in an age and against a society that had surrendered to cowardice. This view is blind to the neurotic compulsions which drove him to his maniacal ransacking of the world's scholarship without enabling him to use it beyond his edition of De Wette, to his pitifully limited aesthetic sense, to the facile nature of his few basic ideas, his intuitive and utterly dogmatic trust in his conception of God and immortality, and the repetitious banality of most of his published works.

Yet both these conceptions become useless once we penetrate to a more important context, because both of them are formulated

on superficial levels of conventional categorization which bear only a distant relation to a deeper level wherein the true significance of Theodore Parker resides. On this other plane there is no such fundamental conflict between an oversimplified liberalism and a grotesque conservatism. On this level, both parties were, and in the American Protestant community still are, entangled within the same net of confusion. If we take the term "theological liberalism" to mean roughly the syndrome of propositions Parker put forth — historical criticism of the Bible, rejection of formalized creeds and most especially of the Westminster, assertion of the rights of intuition over speculation and of the heart over the head, along with an elevation of reason over authority, a boundless optimism as to human perfectibility along with a sacred obligation to fight eternally against social evils — then we may conclude that Parker dramatized the hitherto concealed terror within the assurance of progress. An advancing liberalism, he demonstrated, even though this was not his intention, is bound, the more it forges ahead, the more to slacken its attack on the enemy at its front and to turn back, in order to dismantle the great bastions it had formerly erected on what had been frontier outposts, beyond which it has passed. In practice, then, it can never entertain the prospect of ultimate or final victory, or any resting place. It can enjoy no surcease from insecurity and anxiety. Where the orthodox conservative must murder the Lamb of God, where Oedipus must murder his father, in order to enter their inheritance, the liberal has no time for either diversion. He is too busy killing himself. Or, more precisely, in slaying the previous incarnation of himself, as we in this present ceremony are dismembering Theodore Parker. The history of liberal religion is one of perpetual suicide.

Amid these tensions Parker strove to maintain his tremulous balance; amid these he suffered, until at last they did destroy him. What he demands of us is not so much love or even sympathy — though these are rewarding exercises of the spirit when extended to him — but more than these, a full and just comprehension of his and of our own predicament.

SUMMARIES OF DISSERTATIONS

ALVIN J. BEACHY [Th.D.] The Concept of Grace in the Radical Reformation.

This thesis explores the thought of seven of the Radical Reformers and proves conclusively that there was a concept of grace within the Radical Reformation. This was often denied by the Magisterial Reformation where the concept of grace was linked with predestination and the bondage of the will. Here grace from God's side was understood as the eternal decrees of divine election, while, from man's side, it was regarded as God's act of forensic justification expressed in the formula *simul justus et peccator*. Interpreted from this standpoint, grace is a change in status before God, rather than an ontological change within the believer himself.

Throughout the Radical Reformation there is an outright and resolute rejection of predestination and the bondage of the will. Where the Magisterial Reformers read Paul through Augustinian eyes, the Radicals reached back beyond Paul to the Gospels, and among the Gospels they had a preference for the Fourth. Five of the seven considered in this thesis state specifically that their concept of salvation, like that of the Fourth Gospel, is the divinization of man. Here grace means an ontological change within the believer himself, which God brings about through the activity of the Holy Spirit, who renews the divine image in man and makes him a participant in the divine nature.

While the Radicals did not believe that this grace was bestowed because of any merit in man, they did believe that the gift of grace once received made possible a greater degree of Christlikeness than that thought attainable where the forensic concept of grace prevailed. The emphasis upon good works as the fruit of grace by the Radicals led to accusation of "work's righteousness" from the Magisterial Reformers, while their emphasis upon forensic justification often led the Radicals to denounce them as peddlers of "cheap grace." That the two sides of the Reformation worked with differing concepts of grace was not always clear to the participants in the struggle of the sixteenth century, nor has it always been clear to the descendants of the two groups in the contemporary situation.

DAVID B. BRONSON [Th.D.] Aelian and the New Testament: Some Aspects of Early Christian Literature in Relation to a Secular Writer of the Early Second Century.

This study of a popular and thoroughly secular Roman writer is chiefly concerned with his view of "the wonderful" in nature — his works on providence and on divine intervention being lost. In comparing Aelian with the Biblical and Christian literature we find a remarkable lack of interest in "the wonderful," even in divine healing, no "doctrine" of nature, and no systematic attempt to define the categories. By contrast the Bible is explicit in delimiting both God's saving "signs" and also the discernment of those "signs" by faith. The New Testament in particular, starting with the teaching of Jesus, is concerned to specify (and commend) "valid" signs. The Apologists, who incidentally appear to have been better Stoics than Aelian, make almost no use of "an appeal to miracle" (Quadratus in one instance, and Justin in his interpretation of Scripture being the only exceptions). Aelian, then, is a "control" for the discovery of specifically Christian meanings of common terms.

Tom T. Edwards [Ph.D.] Jansenism in Church and State in 17th Century France.

The term "Jansenism" has come to be narrowly synonymous with a controversy over the nature of grace, and it is generally assumed that the heretical nature of the Jansenist position is sufficient to account for the opposition of both Church and State, and the eventual destruction of Port Royal. The present dissertation challenges that assumption. The doctrinal points at stake here seem scarcely to warrant the relentless enmity with which Louis XIV prosecuted the destruction of the community. Actually there were two other points at which Jansenism came into conflict with authority, one in the realm of ecclesiology and the other in politics.

In the ecclesiastical sphere, the dissertation discusses and documents the alliance that was formed between the Jansenists and the Gallican episcopalists in combating the Formulary of 1655, which was Cardinal Mazarin's attempt to enforce acceptance and publication of the Bull, *Cum Occasione* (1653). The chief spokesman among the Jansenists was Antoine Arnauld, who argued against the strictly hierarchical conception of the structure of the Church, maintaining that not only the Bishop of Rome but all bishops received their authority directly from Jesus Christ. Thus they had the right to scrutinize all legislation emanating from Rome.

The second half of the dissertation explores the relations between Port Royal and the Fronde. It is well known that Louis XIV's enmity

towards the community stemmed largely from his suspicion that it was implicated in the uprising against the Regency, but there was no proof. This dissertation offers conclusive evidence that La Vérité Toute Nue (Paris, 1652), a primary *mazarinade* hitherto attributed to Père Faure, was actually written by Robert Arnauld d'Andilly, brother of Antoine.

ELDON JAY EPP [Ph.D.] Theological Tendency in the Textual Variants of Codex Bezae Cantabrigiensis: Anti-Judaic Tendencies in Acts.

A "theological" approach to textual criticism, applied to Codex Bezae, indicates that the "Western" text of Acts which is represented in this manuscript (D-text) contains a strongly heightened anti-Judaic tendency, which reveals itself in the following manner:

1) The D-text portrays the Jews and their leaders as more hostile toward Jesus and assigns to them a greater responsibility for his death than does the B-text. A positive emphasis on Jesus as Lord and Messiah accentuates Jesus over-against Judaism and stresses the heinousness of the Jews' action against him.

2) The D-text minimizes the response of the Jews and the importance of Judaism and its institutions to the new faith and diminishes the value of the customs of Judaism itself. This devaluation and bypassing of Judaism is developed in view of and in contrast to a clearly greater Gentile interest and a more distinctly emphasized universalism. A positive stress on certain features (notably the Holy Spirit) which distinguish Christianity from Judaism appears frequently in contexts which, in the D-text, are anti-Judaic or pro-Gentile.

3) The D-text portrays the Jews, and especially their leaders, as more hostile toward the apostles and as persecuting them more vigorously. At the same time, the D-text emphasizes the apostles themselves as the leaders of the church over-against the opposing Jews, revealing a "leaders versus leaders" motif — Jewish leaders versus Christian leaders, the former oppressing the latter, but the latter triumphing over the former. Moreover, in contrast to the D-text's handling of the Jews and Jewish leaders, the Roman officials are treated with reserve and, on occasion, are freed from blame for the difficulties of the apostles.

In short, the Jews come out rather poorly in the D-text, which is both considerably more consistent in delineating its special viewpoint and somewhat more abundant in its evidence than might be expected of an aberrant textual tradition.

ROBERT ALAN KRAFT [Ph.D.] The Epistle of Barnabas Its Quotations and Their Sources.

This thesis examines the explicit quotations in the Epistle of Barnabas, and especially those which deviate significantly from known Old Testament texts, in an effort to determine whether such an approach can shed any light on the enigmas of the Epistle and on Christian origins in general.

In Part I, the present state of Barnabean studies is summarized and a probe is made into the complex textual problems of the Epistle. There follows a comprehensive overview of the quotations and their *formulae citandi* as they are found in Barnabas 2–16 and an analysis of the sources available for quotation by a late first or early second century author in the Jewish and Christian tradition.

Against this background, Part II of the thesis investigates the affinities of Barnabas' quotations with similar materials in late Jewish and early Christian writings. The Epistle is found to be composed of smaller "tradition blocks" consisting of Hellenistic Jewish school materials which, by means of editorial comment, have been adapted to Christian use at an early period. Thus, for example, Barnabas 2–3 rests on a collection of Jewish texts concerning "what the Lord needs," and Barnabas 9–10 unites *Stichwort* collections of quotations concerning "hearing" and "circumcision" with traditional ethical interpretations of the Mosaic food laws.

In the conclusions (Part III), it is suggested that Barnabas is best described as "anti-cultic," not "anti-Judaic," and may reflect a Greek-speaking Essenic school tradition (such as seems to have been present among Philo's "Therapeutae") in which similar materials and arguments already were used in the inner Jewish discussion in pre-Christian times. Indices of Old Testament passages (LXX) and passages from Barnabas are appended to the study.

CECIL LOYD FRANKLIN [Ph.D.] Justin's Concept of Deliberate Concealment in the Old Testament.

Justin's concept of deliberate concealment in the Old Testament is examined chiefly by means of careful word studies of four words which are especially prominent: *παραβολή*, *τύπος*, *σύμβολον*, and *μυστήριον*. All relevant passages are quoted and discussed, and compared with earlier uses of the words, especially by Christian and Jewish authors.

Following are some of the results. When something is said in the Old Testament *ἐν παραβολῇ*, one thing is said, but something different is

meant. Sometimes it seems almost to imply something like a code word. Τύπος refers to a person, thing, or event which is predictive of something, though not in an obvious way. The parallelism between τύπος and object is sometimes quite intricate. Σύμβολον is a more elastic word, which may refer either to sayings or to acts and facts. It has in addition a subtlety of allusiveness beyond that of the others. Μυστήριον basically means "secret prediction," though often the emphasis in the word is on the content or object of secret prediction, rather than the device.

Some attention is given also to the reasons for concealment in the Old Testament, to the philosophical presuppositions and hermeneutical principles which enable Justin to recognize where concealment is present, and to the place of grace in enabling one to see through the concealment.

MANFRED OTTO MEITZEN [Ph.D.] Christian Joy in Contemporary Theology.

In an age when Joy has not been very evident the dissertation attempts an examination of *Christian joy*, a birthright of the Christian faith, which should be more evident in contemporary theology and which should have more influence on secular thinking. The goal in preparing this dissertation is not that *Christian joy* would thereby be conjured up; for the study makes clear that *Christian joy*, which is regarded as a *feeling* throughout, is instigated by the Spirit alone. *Christian joy* is an experience which happens to those who believe in Jesus Christ. Because this is true, *Christian joy* cannot be commanded and it cannot be considered a duty of the Christian life.

The dissertation begins with a discussion of the phenomenological and semantic difficulties involved in discussing feelings, especially the feeling of *Christian joy*. The dissertation distinguishes *Christian joy* from any other kind of *joy* and thereby avoids enormous semantic and phenomenological confusion. It regards *Christian joy* as a unique experience of the Christian believer. The theory of stratification, developed by the phenomenologists, is employed for the purpose of seeing more clearly the relation of *Christian joy* to other feelings, such as blessedness or pleasure. However, phenomenology does not supply any *knowledge* about the nature of *Christian joy*. Also, a relatively long chapter about joy in the Scriptures is included as a necessity in laying a foundation for a study of *Christian joy* in contemporary theology. The Scriptures are normative for anything that is said about *Christian joy*.

The study then turns to the contemporary scene. Significant discussions on *Christian joy*, so far as they appear, are presented and criticized. The theological discussions of *Christian joy* found in the writings of Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, Julius Schniewind, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer receive the most attention. The thesis then attempts a consideration of aspects of *Christian joy* that have been omitted in these contemporary discussions. Such questions as the possibility of divine joy or the relation of *Christian joy* and healing or the relation of *Christian joy* and humor are raised and discussed.

In the light of what has been said, a synopsis of the meaning of *Christian joy* follows. Throughout, *Christian joy* is studied primarily in terms of its motivations. No definition of *Christian joy* can be supplied. It is shown that there are two primary motivations: (1) anticipation of that which is to occur in the Kingdom of God and moreover in the life of the believer; (2) a proper relationship with God in the present. The first is oriented toward the future; the second is oriented toward the present. The future orientation is dynamic; the present orientation is static. The dynamic, future element is most characteristic of *Christian joy*. The dissertation shows how these two primary motivations are inextricably bound together. Among many other observations about *Christian joy,* the dialectic between *Christian joy* and sorrow is emphasized with the conclusion that, for the Christian, *Christian joy* is weighted in the dialectic.

The last part of the dissertation shows that our age is suffering from a lack of *Christian joy* both on the secular front and on the theological front. The origin of our joylessness is traced from the Renaissance onward. The most direct cause of our joylessness is the "death of God" in the nineteenth century. The manifestations of joylessness in the twentieth century are described in short analyses of contemporary art, music, philosophy, and literature, — areas of culture that are regarded as good indicators of the joylessness of our age. Finally, joyless trends in contemporary theology itself are pointed up.

The dissertation concludes by pointing out that the Western world would be vastly changed were *Christian joy* a greater factor in its culture. It is recognized that a new age of *Christian joy* depends on a new age of faith. A new age of *Christian joy* will come with the appearance of a new Christian theonomy. *Christian joy* is not a product of "asking theology," or analytic theology, though such theology is distinctly valuable, often for apologetic reasons. *Christian joy* must be proclaimed in kerygmatic theology, or "answering theology," be-

cause *Christian joy* is a mercy, a gift from God, that can never be anthropocentrically generated.

WALTER FRANKLIN SMITH [Ph.D.] A Study of Zadokite High Priesthood within the Graeco-Roman Age: from Simeon the Just to the High Priests Appointed by Herod the Great.

There are in the literature numerous "keys" to the understanding of Jewish history of Palestine in the last two centuries before the Christian era: Hellenism versus Orthodoxy, Ptolemies versus Seleucids, Oniad-Tobiad conflict, the struggle of Apocalypticism with Wisdom or Legalism, or as strife rooted in disparate calendrical interpretations. This thesis introduces a new key; namely, the events of this epoch can be seen as the unfortunate result of the machinations involving the high priesthood. This construction can now be stressed in the light of new evidence.

The decline of the Zadokite line began after Simeon the Just (ca. 200 B.C.). The high priestly office was severely regulated by the Seleucid rulers; the temple at Leontopolis in Egypt was founded at this time by Onias IV, a Zadokite. After the Maccabean revolt the Hasmonean family succeeded not only to the governorship of the Jews but also to the high priesthood. There was a schismatic Zadokite community, namely the Essenes, which withdrew from active intercourse with the Jerusalem Temple rather than have contact with a non-Zadokite priesthood. The literature from Qumran demonstrates that the Essenes entertained a strong animus against the Jerusalem high priesthood. The Essenes and Pharisees were both outgrowths of the Hasidim, this rupture occurring during the reign of Simon the Hasmonean. The Pharisees, principally the lay element among the Hasidim, apparently were unwilling to separate from the Jerusalem Sanctuary and were not dissatisfied with the shift in high priestly houses. Support for this view is to be found in the fact that groups which are possibly Pharisaic are mentioned in the Qumran literature and vilified: (1) the House of Absalom, (2) Seekers of Smooth Things, (3) Builders of the Wall. It is also conceivable that the switch in high priestly houses which Simon the Hasmonean effected was likewise the time propitious for the crystallization of the sect of the Sadducees. Moreover, there is ample evidence that the Zadokite line re-emerges in the high priestly appointments made by Herod the Great.

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